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INCENTIVIZING CORPORATE AMERICA TO ERADICATE 
TRANSNATIONAL BRIBERY WORLDWIDE: FEDERAL 
TRANSPARENCY AND VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE UNDER 
THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 
Peter R. Reilly 
Abstract 
In 1977, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
discovered that hundreds of U.S. companies had spent hundreds of 
millions of dollars in bribes to improve business overseas. In response, 
Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), thereby 
making it illegal to bribe foreign officials to obtain a business 
advantage. A major tension has emerged between the federal agencies 
charged with enforcing the FCPA (i.e., the U.S. Department of Justice 
(DOJ) and the SEC), and the corporate entities trying to stay within the 
legal and regulatory bounds of the statute. Specifically, while the 
government appears to be trying to maximize discretion and flexibility 
in carrying out its enforcement duties, companies are calling for more 
transparency and guidance. Unfortunately, the government’s FCPA 
Resource Guide, published in 2012 to provide the public with more 
direction, fails to shed enough light on how to successfully conform to 
this complicated statute.  
This Article focuses on the difficult and strategic decision of whether 
a company should self-report to the government a potential FCPA 
violation. After reviewing the advantages and disadvantages of self-
reporting, this Article argues that the government needs to be more 
transparent and forthcoming regarding the potential benefits of doing 
so; it argues that the government must provide greater transparency 
regarding specific and calculable benefits that can be achieved through 
self-reporting and cooperation in the face of possible FCPA violations. 
Finally, this Article concludes that companies will be more likely to 
self-report such violations—and thereby assist in eradicating the 
scourge of transnational bribery worldwide—only if there is more 
certainty that the benefits achieved from self-reporting will outweigh 
the risks and costs involved. 
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Georgetown University Law Center (2002–2005). I am grateful for the comments I received 
from Cynthia Alkon, Thomas Buley, Michael Green, Jim Hambleton, Kondi Kleinman, Mike 
Koehler, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Tim Mulvaney, Lisa Rich, Matthew Runkel, and Neil Sobol. I 
also wish to thank Patrick Flanagan and the librarians at Texas A&M School of Law for their 
helpful assistance during this project. Of course, all errors are my own. 
 
1
Reilly: Incentivizing Corporate America to Eradicate Transnational Briber
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
1684 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 1685 
 I. THE TRANSNATIONAL BRIBERY PROBLEM 
 AND THE FCPA .................................................................... 1688 
  A. Extent of the Bribery Problem ..................................... 1688 
  B. Brief History of the FCPA ........................................... 1690 
 II. COOPERATION WITH UNCLE SAM: NEGOTIATIONS, 
  CARROTS, AND STICKS ........................................................ 1692 
  A. Cooperating with the DOJ .......................................... 1694 
  B. Cooperating with the SEC ........................................... 1695 
 III. THE CORPORATE SENTENCING CALCULUS .......................... 1700 
  A. Three FCPA Cases with Self-Reporting ...................... 1703 
   1. United States v. Titan Corp. ................................. 1703 
   2. United States v. ABB Ltd. ..................................... 1703 
   3. Johnson & Johnson .............................................. 1704 
  B. Four FCPA Cases Without Self-Reporting ................. 1705 
   1. United States v. Alstom S.A. ................................. 1705 
   2. United States v. Siemens ...................................... 1706 
   3. United States v. Alcoa World  
    Alumina LLC ........................................................ 1707 
   4. United States v. Daimler AG ................................... 1708 
  C. Observations from the Seven Cases ............................ 1709 
 IV. SELF-REPORTING AND THE RALPH LAUREN 
  CORPORATION ..................................................................... 1711 
  A. The Case Against Ralph Lauren Corporation ............. 1712 
  B. Resolving Ralph Lauren Using a 
   Non-Prosecution Agreement ....................................... 1713 
  C. The Fairness of Non-Prosecution Agreements ............ 1714 
 V. TOWARD AN FCPA SELF-REPORTING CALCULUS ............... 1717 
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................... 1725 
  
2
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 5 [2016], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss5/4
2015] INCENTIVIZING CORPORATE AMERICA TO ERADICATE TRANSNATIONAL BRIBERY 1685 
 
INTRODUCTION 
For nearly four decades, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)1 
has worked to help eradicate the bribing2 of foreign officials to obtain 
business advantages. When is it strategically wise for companies to self-
report violations of the FCPA to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) 
or the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)? Top DOJ 
officials state that voluntary disclosure is an important factor in 
deciding whether and how to prosecute a company, and the agency “has 
and will continue to provide meaningful credit”3 for companies that 
self-report.4 The director of the SEC’s Enforcement Division answers 
the question even more forcefully: “[A]ny company that does the 
calculus will realize that self-reporting [FCPA misconduct] is always in 
the company’s best interest.”5  
                                                                                                                     
 1. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78q(b)(2)–(3), 78dd-1 to -3 
(2012) (amended 1988 and 1998). 
 2. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 186 (7th ed. 1999) (defining bribery as “[t]he corrupt 
payment, receipt, or solicitation of a private favor for official action”). 
 3. Mike Koehler, World Bribery & Corruption Compliance Forum—Comments by U.S. 
Officials, FCPA PROFESSOR (Sept. 16, 2010), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/world-bribery-
corruption-compliance-forum-comments-by-u-s-officials [hereinafter Koehler, World Bribery] 
(quoting Charles Duross, then-Deputy Chief of the DOJ’s Criminal–Fraud Section); see also 
Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney General, Speech at the American Conference Institute’s 
31st International Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 19, 2014), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-leslie-r-caldwell-speaks-
american-conference-institute-s-31st (“[W]e still encourage and reward self-disclosure and 
cooperation.”); Alice S. Fisher, Assistant Attorney General, Prepared Remarks at the American 
Bar Association National Institute on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Oct. 16, 2006), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/pr/speech/2006/10-16-06AAGFCPASpeech
.pdf (“[I]f you are doing the things you should be doing—whether it is self-policing, self-
reporting, conducting proactive risk assessments, improving your controls and procedures, 
training on the FCPA, or cooperating with an investigation after it starts—you will get a 
benefit.”). 
 4. Rachel Louise Ensign, Why Companies Might Opt to Self-Report Potential Bribery 
Issues, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 2, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/why-companies-might-opt-to-
self-report-potential-bribery-issues-1414974824 (quoting James Koukios, Senior Deputy Chief 
of the DOJ’s Criminal–Fraud Section).  
 5. Andrew Ceresney, Director, Enforcement Division, SEC, Remarks at 31st 
International Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 19, 2014) [hereinafter 
Ceresney, Conference Remarks] (emphasis added), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/
Speech/Detail/Speech/1370543493598#.VLyNb7lOWM8; see also Andrew Ceresney, Keynote 
Address at the International Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 19, 2103), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370540392284#.UrUvXJqA2M8 
(“Some lawyers sometimes ask me what is the incentive to notify us promptly about 
wrongdoing that you uncover? The answer is simple—if we find the violations on our own, the 
consequences will surely be worse than if you had self-reported the conduct . . . . We have a 
wide range of tools available to us to facilitate and reward meaningful cooperation—from 
reduced charges and penalties, to taking no action at all.”). 
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However, academics, attorneys, and consultants who research, 
practice, and advise in the area of the FCPA suggest that the answer to 
this pivotal question is a bit more nuanced and complicated. As a 
partner in a leading national law firm puts it: “Voluntary disclosure is a 
business decision . . . . What are the costs and benefits? Right now it’s a 
guessing game.”6 Despite exhortations from the federal government for 
businesses to self-report FCPA violations and obtain the attendant 
benefits, this Article suggests that there are times when it might not be a 
good idea, from a business perspective, for corporate entities to do so. 
In other words, this Article suggests that under current DOJ and SEC 
policy, a company’s ability and willingness to self-report is not always 
strategically wise in the context of FCPA enforcement. This Article 
explores, through the lens of a number of significant FCPA cases, the 
many factors companies must consider when making this difficult 
decision. This Article also investigates the policies and programs used 
by the federal government to persuade corporate entities to self-report 
and cooperate, including the kinds of results that might be achieved 
from doing so. This Article demonstrates that although the risks 
associated with voluntary disclosure tend to be concrete and predictable, 
the rewards have been largely uncertain—a calculus that oftentimes 
militates against disclosure.  
This Article is divided into five Parts: Part I discusses the extent of 
the transnational bribery problem and provides a brief history of the 
FCPA. Part II discusses how corporate entities can cooperate with the 
DOJ and SEC in the context of a potential FCPA violation, including 
how the DOJ’s Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business 
Organizations (Principles of Prosecution) and the SEC’s so-called 
“Seaboard Report” and “Penalties Statement” play a role in evaluating 
cooperation. Part II also discusses how the DOJ and SEC might use 
various tools, such as deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) and non-
prosecution agreements (NPAs), to reward the cooperating entities. This 
Part underscores the enormous amount of discretion both agencies have 
in deciding whether, and to what degree, they will bestow benefits upon 
corporate entities for self-reporting and other cooperative behavior.  
Part III discusses Chapter Eight of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
(Sentencing Guidelines), which governs the sentencing of organizations 
and provides incentives for the voluntary disclosure of potential FCPA 
violations. To provide a sense of how various factors influence the final 
outcome of FCPA cases, this Part reviews the plea agreements and 
DPAs of seven well-known FCPA matters. All seven cases involve 
                                                                                                                     
 6. Ensign, supra note 4 (emphasis added) (quoting Laurence Urgenson, Partner at Mayer 
Brown LLP).  
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some of the largest FCPA fines paid in U.S. history.7 In three of the 
cases, the defendant elected to self-report the matter to the federal 
government, and in four of the cases, the defendant failed to self-report. 
This Part concludes, based on the seven cases reviewed and additional 
scholarship in the area, that (1) voluntary disclosure does not appear to 
correlate with reduced monetary penalties in FCPA matters, and (2) the 
ultimate outcome of a government FCPA investigation appears to 
depend more on the seriousness of a company’s transgression than on 
whether the company self-reported that transgression to the government. 
Part IV reviews the Ralph Lauren Corporation FCPA matter, a 
widely reported case in the legal press that stands for the proposition 
that self-reporting is strategically the best course of action for a 
company due to the potential benefits. This Part challenges that 
proposition and, furthermore, questions the fairness of using DPAs and 
NPAs as vehicles for disposing of FCPA matters instead of following 
the more traditional routes of plea bargains or trials.8 Part V attempts to 
develop an FCPA self-reporting calculus by setting forth both the 
advantages and disadvantages of self-reporting.  
Finally, this Article links together observations from Parts I through 
V and concludes that (1) it could sometimes be reasonable for a 
corporate entity, when faced with the discovery of an FCPA violation, 
to decide not to voluntarily disclose the wrongdoing; and (2) to increase 
the likelihood that companies will consistently self-report FCPA 
violations, and thereby assist in eradicating the scourge of transnational 
bribery worldwide, the DOJ and SEC must be far more transparent. 
Their policies, pronouncements, rules, and regulations must provide 
more certain, specific, and calculable incentives to companies for 
volunteering to come forward.  
  
                                                                                                                     
 7. See Richard L. Cassin, With Alstom, Three French Companies Are Now in the FCPA 
Top Ten, FCPA BLOG (Dec. 23, 2014, 9:45 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/12/23/
with-alstom-three-french-companies-are-now-in-the-fcpa-top-t.html#. 
 8. In a plea bargain, defendants negotiate for a lesser charge, penalty, or sentence, but in 
general they ultimately accept both guilt and conviction. See Benjamin M. Greenblum, Note, 
What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? Judicial Oversight of Corporate Deferred 
Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863, 1869 (2005) (“A guilty plea [in a plea 
bargain] results in a conviction and collateral consequences attach no differently than if the 
offender had been convicted in a trial.”). Of course, an Alford plea would involve a no-contest 
plea where the defendant accepts a conviction but does not admit guilt. See Stephanos Bibas, 
Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford 
and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1362, 1372 (2003). 
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I.  THE TRANSNATIONAL BRIBERY PROBLEM AND THE FCPA 
Corporations have engaged in transnational bribery for almost four 
hundred years. This Part discusses the pervasiveness of the practice and 
provides a brief history of the FCPA, which represents Congress’s 
attempt to combat the problem of corporate transnational bribery.  
A.  Extent of the Bribery Problem 
The first reported case of corporate foreign bribery occurred in the 
seventeenth century, when the British East India Company bribed 
Mogul rulers with rare and exotic treasures in return for a tax break on 
exports.9 Today, the World Bank Institute estimates that the total 
amount of bribes paid per year worldwide is approximately $1 trillion.10 
Alexandra Wrage, President of TRACE International, a nonprofit 
business association whose mission is to raise international standards of 
anti-bribery compliance, states that bribery is not only “wrong” but also 
“uneconomical, inefficient, costly, distorting of proper incentives and 
outcomes, risky, and generally unprofitable.”11 A leading FCPA scholar 
concludes that “[b]ribery blights lives, undermines democracy, and 
distorts markets.”12 Other scholars have demonstrated its dramatically 
negative impact on economies throughout the world, including the 
“power to reduce private foreign investment into countries that host 
bribery, lower a host country’s tax base, and positively correlate with 
reduced economic development.”13 In short, bribery “harms 
governments, commercial entities, global markets, and the public at 
large.”14  
Nevertheless, bribery and corruption appear to be both relentless and 
pervasive. Ernst & Young’s 13th Global Fraud Survey, which included 
2719 interviews of senior decision makers in a sample of the largest 
companies throughout fifty-nine countries and territories, found that a 
majority of respondents in 40% of those countries felt there was 
                                                                                                                     
 9. Milton S. Gwirtzman, Is Bribery Defensible?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 5, 1975, at 19. 
 10. Six Questions on the Cost of Corruption with World Bank Institute Global 
Governance Director Daniel Kaufmann, WORLD BANK, http://go.worldbank.org/KQH743GKF1 
(last visited July 22, 2015). 
 11. ALEXANDRA ADDISON WRAGE, BRIBERY AND EXTORTION: UNDERMINING BUSINESS, 
GOVERNMENTS, AND SECURITY 124 (2007). 
 12. Joseph W. Yockey, Solicitation, Extortion, and the FCPA, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
781, 783 (2011). 
 13. Jeffrey R. Boles, The Two Faces of Bribery: International Corruption Pathways Meet 
Conflicting Legislative Regimes, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 673, 679–80 (2014). 
 14. Id. at 680. For an overview of the harms that flow from transnational bribery, see 
Philip M. Nichols, Regulating Transnational Bribery in Times of Globalization and 
Fragmentation, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 257, 274–79 (1999). 
6
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 5 [2016], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss5/4
2015] INCENTIVIZING CORPORATE AMERICA TO ERADICATE TRANSNATIONAL BRIBERY 1689 
 
widespread corruption.15 In Egypt, Kenya, and Nigeria, 80% of the 
respondents perceived widespread corruption.16 Moreover, 
Transparency International’s 2014 Progress Report on global 
enforcement of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development’s (OECD) Anti-Bribery Convention concludes that global 
trade is a long way from being corruption-free.17 The report declares 
specifically that “the performance of the majority of the 40 countries 
that agree to combat foreign bribery in international business 
transactions is far from satisfactory.”18  
Interestingly, the report found that in a majority of cases, high-level 
management is involved in the bribery. In 41% of cases, corporate 
managers sanctioned the wrongdoing, and in an additional 12% of 
cases, the CEO permitted the bribes.19 Additionally, two other 
researchers sum up the pervasiveness of foreign bribery: “[Corruption] 
stretches from multinational firms in the United States, to manufacturers 
in China, to farmers in Latin America. It has led to water scarcity in 
Spain, child labor in China, illegal logging in Indonesia, unsafe 
medicine in Nigeria and poorly constructed buildings in Turkey, where 
collapses have killed people.”20  
                                                                                                                     
 15. ERNST & YOUNG, 13TH GLOBAL FRAUD SURVEY 12, 22 (2014), available at 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-13th-Global-Fraud-Survey/$FILE/EY-13th-
Global-Fraud-Survey.pdf. 
 16. Id. at 12. 
 17. Fritz Heimann et al., Exporting Corruption: Progress Report 2014: Assessing 
Enforcement of the OECD Convention on Combating Foreign Bribery, TRANSPARENCY INT’L 2 
(2014), available at http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/exporting_corruption
_progress_report_2014_assessing_enforcement_of_the_oecd. Note that forty-one nations have 
signed the 1997 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: thirty-four OECD member countries and 
seven non-member countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Latvia, Russia, 
and South Africa. Press Release, OECD, Latvia to Join OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (July 4, 
2014), available at http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/latvia-to-join-oecd-anti-bribery-
convention.htm; see also Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions (1997), S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-43, reprinted in 37 I.L.M 1 (1998), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf. 
 18. Heimann et al., supra note 17, at 4. Only four of the forty countries that subscribe to 
the Anti-Bribery Convention engage in active enforcement: Germany, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. Id. at 4. Twenty-two countries have little enforcement or no 
enforcement whatsoever, including Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Columbia, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Russia, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, and Turkey. 
Id. at 4–5. 
 19. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD FOREIGN BRIBERY REPORT: AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE CRIME OF BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS 22 (2014). 
 20. Francis X. Donnelly & Sarah Kellogg, Understanding Corruption, GEO. WASH. BUS., 
Fall 2011, at 9. 
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SEC Chairperson Mary Jo White stated that FCPA enforcement is 
“among the most prominent concerns” facing the agency in the 
international arena.21 She also acknowledged that transgression of the 
statute “not only undermines international markets and governments but 
also simultaneously undermines the reporting and disclosure integrity of 
our own markets.”22 This helps explain why the SEC, DOJ, and the U.S. 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have collaborated in conducting a 
foreign bribery training program for 130 investigators and prosecutors 
from thirty different countries around the world.23 It also helps explain 
why the FBI recently created three squads to specifically target FCPA 
violations originating abroad and reaching the United States.24 The FBI 
will assign approximately thirty agents to the squads in Los Angeles, 
New York, and Washington, D.C.25 Jeffrey Sallet, the FBI’s Public 
Corruption Chief, stated in an interview: “Corruption leads to lack of 
confidence in government. Lack of confidence in government leads to 
failed states. Failed states lead to terror and national security issues.”26 
B.  Brief History of the FCPA 
In 1977, the SEC discovered that hundreds of U.S. companies had 
invested hundreds of millions of dollars in foreign bribery to improve 
business overseas.27 Recognizing that such corruption “imposes 
enormous costs both at home and abroad, leading to market 
inefficiencies and instability, sub-standard products, and an unfair 
playing field for honest business,” Congress passed the FCPA.28 The 
law criminalizes bribing foreign officials to obtain a business advantage 
and also requires companies registered with the SEC to keep accurate 
books and records.29 Thus, two sets of provisions make up the statute: 
                                                                                                                     
 21. Mary Jo White, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Chairperson, Speech to the 
Investment Company Institute: Regulation in a Global Financial System (May 1, 2013). 
 22. Id.; Donnelly & Kellogg, supra note 20, at 9. 
 23. White, supra note 21.  
 24. Eric Tucker, New FBI Squads Put Foreign Crime in Crosshairs, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 
14, 2015, http://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/economy/article/New-FBI-squads-put-
foreign-crime-in-crosshairs-6016628.php. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIM. DIV. & SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT DIV., 
DOJ-12-1354, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 3 (2012), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf 
[hereinafter FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE]. 
 28. Id.; see also Andrew Brady Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions: Understanding Anti-
Bribery Legislation as Economic Sanctions Against Emerging Markets, 62 FLA. L. REV. 351, 
360 (2010) (describing Lockheed Martin’s earlier foreign bribery controversy). 
 29. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, § 78m (2012).  
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the anti-bribery provisions,30 and the books and records and internal 
control provisions.31 The anti-bribery provisions make it illegal for 
companies to bribe foreign officials to obtain or retain business, 
therefore making it a crime to give money, gifts, promises, or “anything 
of value” to any foreign official for the purpose of  
(i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in 
his official capacity, (ii) inducing such foreign official to do 
or omit to do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such 
official, or (iii) securing any improper advantage; or (B) 
inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a 
foreign government or instrumentality thereof to affect or 
influence any act or decision of such government or 
instrumentality, in order to assist such person in obtaining 
or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, 
any person . . . .32  
The books and records and internal control provisions require 
companies registered with the SEC to maintain accurate books and 
records and to implement an effective system of internal accounting 
controls.33 The DOJ and SEC together enforce the statute,34 generally 
with the DOJ enforcing the bribery provisions and the SEC enforcing 
the accounting provisions.35 In 1988, Congress amended the FCPA to 
allow for affirmative defenses,36 and in 1998, Congress further 
expanded the law’s territorial jurisdiction and authority.37 
                                                                                                                     
 30. See id. §§ 78dd-1 to -3.  
 31. See id. § 78m(b). 
 32. Id. §§ 78dd-1 to -3. Note that the brief excerpt appearing in the text attempts to 
capture the essence of a far more detailed and intricate statute. 
 33. Mike Koehler, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT IN A NEW ERA 136–37 (2014). 
 34. Stuart H. Deming, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND THE NEW 
INTERNATIONAL NORMS 75 (2d ed. 2010). 
 35. Lillian V. Blageff, 1 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT REPORTER § 1:1 (2d ed.); see 
also Cortney C. Thomas, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Decade of Rapid 
Expansion Explained, Defended, and Justified, 29 REV. LITIG. 439, 444 n.27 (2010) (discussing 
the history of the FCPA). 
 36. Mike Koehler, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT IN A NEW ERA 120–21 (2014). 
Koehler discusses both affirmative defenses: The first is for payments that are considered to be 
acceptable pursuant to the laws and regulations within a given foreign nation; the second is for 
reasonable and legitimate payments related to particular products, services, or contracts. 
 37. FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 2727, at 4 (noting that Congress amended the 
FCPA to comport with the newly-created Anti-Bribery Convention, of which the United States 
was a founding party). The “amendments expanded the FCPA’s scope to: (1) include payments 
made to secure ‘any improper advantage’; (2) reach certain foreign persons who commit an act 
in furtherance of a foreign bribe while in the United States; (3) cover public international 
organizations in the definition of ‘foreign official’; (4) add an alternative basis for jurisdiction 
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During the first two decades after its passage, enforcement of the 
FCPA was somewhat limited: Between 1977 and 1997, prosecutors 
only charged seventeen companies and thirty-three individuals under 
the Act.38 Starting in the early 2000s, however, enforcement of the 
FCPA began to surge. From 2007 through 2014, there were 309 
enforcement actions by the SEC and DOJ combined.39 In that same time 
period, the average total value of monetary resolutions in corporate 
FCPA enforcement actions increased dramatically from $7.3 million in 
2007 to $156.6 million in 2014.40 Indeed, the Alstom S.A. case settled in 
December 2014 for a total resolution of $772.3 million—just short of 
the record-holding $800 million resolution of the Siemens AG matter in 
2008.41 
II.  COOPERATION WITH UNCLE SAM: NEGOTIATIONS, CARROTS, AND 
STICKS 
In his seminal article, Corporate Prosecution, Cooperation, and the 
Trading of Favors, Professor William S. Laufer suggests that law 
enforcement within the corporate context oftentimes translates into “a 
brand of negotiated compliance” involving “reciprocal promises,” 
where companies cooperate and accept responsibility “in exchange for 
mitigation, exculpation, or absolution.”42 Professor Laufer uses 
language of negotiation theory as he refers to this “bargained-for 
exchange or trading of favors, with an arsenal of sanctions in the 
background.”43 Professor Laufer states:  
 
With the threat of significant . . . fines, corporations have 
little choice but to trade favors with authorities. The 
importance of and need for these reciprocal promises is 
rarely challenged. Given extremely limited resources, the 
complex nature of the corporate form, and the 
accompanying evidentiary challenges facing prosecutors, it 
is little wonder that the government often exchanges 
                                                                                                                     
based on nationality; and (5) apply criminal penalties to foreign nationals employed by or acting 
as agents of U.S. companies.” Id. 
 38. Tor Krever, Curbing Corruption? The Efficacy of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
33 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 83, 94 (2007).  
 39. See GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2014 YEAR-END FCPA UPDATE 2 (2015), 
available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2014-Year-End-FCPA-
Update.pdf. 
 40. See id. at 3. 
 41. Id. at 4. 
 42. William S. Laufer, Corporate Prosecution, Cooperation, and the Trading of Favors, 
87 IOWA L. REV. 643, 645–47 (2002). 
 43. Id. at 646. 
10
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 5 [2016], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss5/4
2015] INCENTIVIZING CORPORATE AMERICA TO ERADICATE TRANSNATIONAL BRIBERY 1693 
 
leniency for conciliatory post-offense behavior.44 
 
Other scholars have described the interaction between prosecutors 
and corporate defendants not as a negotiation involving a “bargained-for 
exchange,” but rather as the unfolding of a “carrot and stick” situation. 
As an article published by The Economist stated in 1946: “The human 
donkey requires either a carrot in front or a stick behind to goad it into 
activity. . . .”45 Indeed, implicit in the organizational sentencing 
guidelines of the U.S. Sentencing Commission (Sentencing 
Commission) is a “carrot and stick” structure. Winthrop M. Swenson, 
formerly the Sentencing Commission’s Deputy General Counsel, 
described first the “stick” and then the “carrot” at a Sentencing 
Commission conference on corporate crime in America:  
[C]ompanies that (1) fail to take certain actions (e.g., 
establish strong compliance programs, voluntarily disclose 
misconduct, fully cooperate in the investigation of the 
misconduct) and (2) have attributes indicating greater 
institutional culpability for misconduct (e.g., had senior 
corporate officials involved in the offense, or had 
employees obstruct justice) face stiff penalties in the event 
of a violation. Companies that take the prescribed steps, 
and do not evince attributes of greater institutional 
culpability, will avoid onerous penalties should a violation 
happen to occur.46  
One scholar argues, however, that the Sentencing Commission’s 
approach may have exhibited more stick than carrot, stating: “If a 
company adopted a compliance program and self-reported violations, it 
received no guarantee of leniency. On the other hand, the failure to 
pursue the carrot ‘voluntarily’ virtually guaranteed being hit with the 
stick in the event of a corporate conviction.”47 To what extent, then, 
does the current cooperation dynamic between prosecutors and 
defendant corporations represent a “negotiation” or “trading of favors,” 
and to what extent does it represent more of a “carrot and stick” 
situation, where the “carrot in front” or the “stick behind” effectively 
                                                                                                                     
 44. Id. 
 45. The Carrot and the Stick, THE ECONOMIST, June 29, 1946, reprinted in 8 AM. AFF. 
282, 282 (1946). 
 46. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, CORPORATE CRIME IN AMERICA: STRENGTHENING THE 
“GOOD CITIZEN” CORPORATION at 24 (1995) (emphasis added), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/organizational-guidelines/special-reports/ 
wcsympo.pdf. 
 47. John S. Baker, Jr., Reforming Corporations Through Threats of Federal Prosecution, 
89 CORNELL L. REV. 310, 317 (2004) (footnote omitted). 
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prods companies into self-reporting and exhibiting other cooperating 
behaviors toward the government? Or does the interplay between 
prosecutors and defendant companies effectively encompass elements 
of all three—negotiations, carrots, and sticks? A closer look at the 
policies and regulations surrounding corporate cooperation with the 
DOJ and SEC can begin to shed light on these questions. 
A.  Cooperating with the DOJ 
The Filip Memo,48 officially entitled “Principles of Federal 
Prosecution of Business Organizations” (Principles of Prosecution), was 
codified49 in the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual on August 28, 2008.50 The 
Principles of Prosecution instruct federal prosecutors to consider the 
following nine factors when determining whether or not to charge a 
corporation or business entity:  
(1) [T]he nature and seriousness of the offense, including 
the risk of harm to the public, and applicable policies 
and priorities, if any, governing the prosecution of 
corporations for particular categories of crime; 
(2) [T]he pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the 
corporation, including the complicity in, or the 
condoning of, the wrongdoing by corporate 
management; 
(3) [T]he corporation’s history of similar conduct, 
including prior criminal, civil, and regulatory 
enforcement actions against it; 
(4) [T]he corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of 
wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the 
investigation of its agents; 
(5) [T]he existence and effectiveness of the corporation’s 
pre-existing compliance program; 
(6) [T]he corporation’s remedial actions, including any 
efforts to implement an effective corporate compliance 
                                                                                                                     
 48. Memorandum from Mark Filip, Deputy Attorney Gen., to Heads of Department 
Components and U.S. Attorneys (Aug. 28, 2008) [hereinafter Filip Memo], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/dag/legacy/2008/11/03/dag-memo-08282008.pdf. 
  49. Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney Gen., Remarks at New York University Law 
School’s Program on Corporate Compliance and Enforcement (Apr. 17, 2015). 
 50. See Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organization, in U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 9-28.000 (2008) [hereinafter UNITED STATES 
ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL], available at http://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-28000-principles-
federal-prosecution-business-organizations.  
12
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 5 [2016], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss5/4
2015] INCENTIVIZING CORPORATE AMERICA TO ERADICATE TRANSNATIONAL BRIBERY 1695 
 
program or to improve an existing one, to replace 
responsible management, to discipline or terminate 
wrongdoers, to pay restitution, and to cooperate with 
the relevant government agencies;  
(7) [C]ollateral consequences, including whether there is 
disproportionate harm to shareholders, pension 
holders, employees, and others not proven personally 
culpable, as well as the impact on the public arising 
from the prosecution; 
(8) [T]he adequacy of the prosecution of individuals 
responsible for the corporation’s malfeasance; and 
(9) [T]he adequacy of remedies such as civil or regulatory 
enforcement actions.51  
The fourth and sixth factors involve voluntary disclosure and 
cooperation with the government.52 It is important to note, however, that 
the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual makes it clear that the Principles of 
Prosecution do not create specific legal rights for the parties involved, 
stating: “The Manual provides only internal Department of Justice 
guidance. It is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon to 
create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any 
party in any matter civil or criminal.”53  
Moreover, the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual makes it clear that, despite 
the nine factors set forth in the Principles of Prosecution, prosecutors 
retain significant charging discretion regarding violations of federal 
criminal law.54 Indeed, the last sentence of the Filip Memo 
reemphasizes the wide discretion given to prosecutors in carrying out 
their charging duties, stating: “Nor are any limitations hereby placed on 
otherwise lawful litigative prerogatives of the Department of Justice.”55 
B.  Cooperating with the SEC 
The SEC issued its so-called Seaboard Report in October 2001.56 
The Seaboard Report attempted to reveal how the agency decided what 
                                                                                                                     
 51. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 50, at 9-28.300. 
 52. Id.  
 53. Id. at 1-1.100 (emphasis added). 
 54. See Filip Memo, supra note 48, at 4 (“In making a decision to charge a corporation, 
the prosecutor generally has substantial latitude in determining when, whom, how, and even 
whether to prosecute for violations of federal criminal law.”). 
 55. Id. at 21. 
 56. Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement 
Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 34-44969, 76 SEC Docket 220 (Oct. 23, 2001) 
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penalties to impose on companies that violated the federal securities 
laws.57 The Seaboard Report recognized four measures of a company’s 
cooperation:  
Self-policing prior to the discovery of the misconduct, 
including establishing effective compliance procedures and 
an appropriate tone at the top; 
Self-reporting of misconduct when it is discovered, 
including conducting a thorough review of the nature, 
extent, origins, and consequences of the misconduct, and 
promptly, completely, and effectively disclosing the 
misconduct to the public, to regulators, and to self-
regulators; 
Remediation, including dismissing or appropriately 
disciplining wrongdoers, modifying, and improving 
internal controls and procedures to prevent recurrence of 
the misconduct, and appropriately compensating those 
adversely affected; and 
Cooperation with law enforcement authorities, including 
providing the Commission staff with all information 
relevant to the underlying violations and the company’s 
remedial efforts.58 
The Seaboard Report also sets forth various criteria the SEC considers 
in determining whether (and to what extent) it will give a company 
credit for self-reporting, self-policing, remediation, and cooperation—
“from the extraordinary step of taking no enforcement action to 
bringing reduced charges, seeking lighter sanctions, or including 
mitigating language in documents we use to announce and resolve 
enforcement actions.”59 On January 4, 2006, the SEC issued a statement 
                                                                                                                     
[hereinafter Seaboard Report]. 
 57. See id. 
 58. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Issues Report of Investigation and 
Statement Setting Forth Framework for Evaluating Cooperation in Exercising Prosecutorial 
Discretion (Oct. 23, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/headlines/prosdiscretion.htm. 
 59. Seaboard Report, supra note 56. The following questions assist in guiding the SEC 
investigations: 
1. What is the nature of the misconduct involved? . . .   
2. How did the misconduct arise? . . . 
3. Where in the organization did the misconduct occur? . . . 
4. How long did the misconduct last? . . .  
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to elaborate further on the role that cooperation plays in the agency’s 
determination of whether to impose monetary penalties on 
corporations.60 The statement, which has come to be known as the 
“Penalties Statement,”61 announced that the two primary factors that the 
SEC considers are “[t]he presence or absence of a direct benefit to the 
corporation as a result of the violation”62 and “[t]he degree to which the 
penalty will recompense or further harm the injured shareholders.”63 
                                                                                                                     
5. How much harm has the misconduct inflicted upon investors and other 
corporate constituencies? Did the share price of the company's stock drop 
significantly upon its discovery and disclosure?  
6. How was the misconduct detected and who uncovered it?  
7. How long after discovery of the misconduct did it take to implement an 
effective response?  
8. What steps did the company take upon learning of the misconduct? . . . 
9. What processes did the company follow to resolve many of these issues 
and ferret out necessary information? . . .  
10. Did the company commit to learn the truth, fully and expeditiously? . . .  
11. Did the company promptly make available to our staff the results of its 
review and provide sufficient documentation reflecting its response to the 
situation? . . .  
12. What assurances are there that the conduct is unlikely to recur? . . . 
13. Is the company the same company in which the misconduct occurred, or 
has it changed through a merger or bankruptcy reorganization?  
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 60. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), available at 
www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm. 
 61. See, e.g., Barry W. Rashkover & Laurin Blumenthal Kleiman, SEC Enforcement and 
Examinations Concerning Hedge Funds, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 599, 632 (2008); Annette L. 
Nazareth, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch.Comm’n, Remarks Before the American Bar Association 
National Institute on Securities Fraud (Sept. 28, 2006), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/2006/spch092806aln.htm. 
 62. See id. (“The fact that a corporation itself has received a direct and material benefit 
from the offense, for example through reduced expenses or increased revenues, weighs in 
support of the imposition of a corporate penalty. If the corporation is in any other way unjustly 
enriched, this similarly weighs in support of the imposition of a corporate penalty. Within this 
parameter, the strongest case for the imposition of a corporate penalty is one in which the 
shareholders of the corporation have received an improper benefit as a result of the violation; 
the weakest case is one in which the current shareholders of the corporation are the principal 
victims of the securities law violation.”). 
 63. See id. (“Because the protection of innocent investors is a principal objective of the 
securities laws, the imposition of a penalty on the corporation itself carries with it the risk that 
shareholders who are innocent of the violation will nonetheless bear the burden of the penalty. 
In some cases, however, the penalty itself may be used as a source of funds to recompense the 
injury suffered by victims of the securities law violations. The presence of an opportunity to use 
the penalty as a meaningful source of compensation to injured shareholders is a factor in support 
of its imposition. The likelihood a corporate penalty will unfairly injure investors, the 
corporation, or third parties weighs against its use as a sanction.”). 
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Other factors include the need for deterrence; any injury caused to third 
parties; the difficulty in detecting the offense; and the company’s level 
of intent, effort in taking remedial action, and cooperation with the 
government and law enforcement.64 
On January 13, 2010, Robert Khuzami, then-Director of the SEC’s 
Division of Enforcement, announced new cooperation practices that 
would be a “potential game-changer.”65 The new policies set forth a 
framework for evaluating cooperation between individuals and the 
SEC.66 The SEC also formally adopted the Seaboard Report as part of 
its Enforcement Manual67 and provided the agency with important 
cooperation tools, including proffer agreements,68 cooperation 
agreements,69 DPAs,70 and NPAs.71 These new policies provided the 
                                                                                                                     
 64. Id. 
 65. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces Initiative to Encourage 
Individuals and Companies to Cooperate and Assist in Investigations (Jan. 13, 2010), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-6.htm. 
 66. Specifically, the SEC staff would consider the following four broad factors: (1) “[t]he 
assistance provided by the cooperating individual;” (2) “[t]he importance of the underlying 
matter in which the individual cooperated;” (3) “[t]he societal interest in ensuring the individual 
is held accountable for his or her misconduct;” and (4) “[t]he appropriateness of cooperation 
credit based upon the risk profile of the cooperating individual.” Id.; SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
DIV. OF ENFORCEMENT, OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL, ENFORCEMENT MANUAL § 6.1.1 (Oct. 9, 
2013) [hereinafter ENFORCEMENT MANUAL], available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/
enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf. Ultimately, the critical inquiry is “whether the public interest 
in facilitating and rewarding an individual’s cooperation in order to advance the Commission’s 
law enforcement interests justifies the credit awarded to the individual for his or her 
cooperation.” Id. 
 67. ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 66, § 6.1.2. 
 68. Id. § 6.2.1 (“A proffer agreement is a written agreement providing that any statements 
made by a person, on a specific date, may not be used against that individual in subsequent 
proceedings, except that the Commission may use statements made during the proffer session as 
a source of leads to discover additional evidence and for impeachment or rebuttal purposes if the 
person testifies or argues inconsistently in a subsequent proceeding.”). 
 69. Id. § 6.2.2 (“A cooperation agreement is a written agreement between the Division of 
Enforcement and a potential cooperating individual or company prepared to provide substantial 
assistance to the Commission’s investigation and related enforcement actions. Specifically, in a 
cooperation agreement, the Division agrees to recommend to the Commission that the individual 
or company receive credit for cooperating in its investigation and related enforcement actions 
and, under certain circumstances, to make specific enforcement recommendations if, among 
other things: 1) the Division concludes that the individual or company has provided or is likely 
to provide substantial assistance to the Commission; 2) the individual or company agrees to 
cooperate truthfully and fully in the Commission’s investigation and related enforcement actions 
and waive the applicable statute of limitations; and 3) the individual or company satisfies 
his/her/its obligations under the agreement. If the agreement is violated, the staff may 
recommend an enforcement action to the Commission against the individual or company 
without any limitation.”). 
 70. Id. § 6.2.3 (“A deferred prosecution agreement is a written agreement between the 
Commission and a potential cooperating individual or company in which the Commission 
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SEC with a tremendous amount of discretion, along with a substantial 
array of options, in deciding whether, when, and how to recognize or 
reward cooperative behavior while carrying out its FCPA enforcement 
actions and proceedings. Indeed, the “Fostering Cooperation” section of 
the SEC Enforcement Manual states explicitly that the agency will 
analyze the “unique facts and circumstances”72 of a given case and that 
the principles applied thereto “are not listed in order of importance; they 
are not intended to be all-inclusive; and . . . facts and circumstances of a 
particular case may render some of the principles inapplicable or worthy of 
lesser or greater weight.” 73  
The end result of these various policies, pronouncements, rules, and 
regulations driving DOJ and SEC decision-making in the realm of 
cooperation is that both agencies have tremendous discretion in how 
they will deal with corporate entities choosing to cooperate with them. 
Not only do both agencies have a substantial array of principles that 
                                                                                                                     
agrees to forego an enforcement action against the individual or company if the individual or 
company agrees to, among other things: 1) cooperate truthfully and fully in the Commission’s 
investigation and related enforcement actions; 2) enter into a long-term tolling agreement; 3) 
comply with express prohibitions and/or undertakings during a period of deferred prosecution; 
and 4) under certain circumstances, agree either to admit or not to contest underlying facts that 
the Commission could assert to establish a violation of the federal securities laws.”). 
 71. Id. § 6.2.4 (“A non-prosecution agreement is a written agreement between the 
Commission and a potential cooperating individual or company, entered in limited and 
appropriate circumstances, that provides that the Commission will not pursue an enforcement 
action against the individual or company if the individual or company agrees to, among other 
things: 1) cooperate truthfully and fully in the Commission’s investigation and related 
enforcement actions; and 2) comply, under certain circumstances, with express undertakings. If 
the agreement is violated, the staff retains its ability to recommend an enforcement action to the 
Commission against the individual or company without limitation.”). 
 72. Id. § 6.1.2. 
 73. Id. § 6.1.1. This statement appears under Section 6.1.1 of the Enforcement Manual, 
addressing cooperation with respect to individuals. Id. While the same statement is not reprinted 
in full under Section 6.1.2 of the Manual, which addresses cooperation with respect to 
companies, one could argue that the statement nonetheless applies to both individuals and 
companies alike. See id. § 6.1.2. Moreover, Section 6.1.2 of the Manual includes the following 
statement, which is similar but nonetheless slightly less detailed and explicit than the statement 
appearing under Section 6.1.1:  
Since every enforcement matter is different, this analytical framework sets 
forth general principles but does not limit the Commission’s broad discretion to 
evaluate every case individually, on its own unique facts and circumstances. 
Similar to the Commission’s treatment of cooperating individuals, credit for 
cooperation by companies may range from taking no enforcement action to 
pursuing reduced charges and sanctions in connection with enforcement 
actions. 
Id. 
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they can apply and options through which to operationalize and 
implement those principles, but they can (1) add principles and options 
that do not yet exist, (2) emphasize any principle to whatever degree 
they see fit, and (3) even ignore principles altogether. 
The tension between the government and corporations, then, is a 
fundamental one. On the one hand, government agencies such as the 
DOJ and SEC are motivated to maximize discretion, autonomy, and 
flexibility as they carry out their respective missions, including 
enforcing statutes such as the FCPA.74 On the other hand, corporate 
entities working to comply with the FCPA need specific and detailed 
guidance and direction on how to effectively stay within legal and 
regulatory bounds. This Article argues that the balance currently tilts 
too heavily in favor of providing the agencies with discretion and 
flexibility, thereby leaving corporate entities flailing as they try to figure 
out how to best conform to the statute. This Article also attempts to 
flesh out and advocate for changes necessary to even out the balance, 
concluding that the DOJ and SEC will have to give up some of their 
discretion and flexibility to ensure that companies have the necessary 
guidance and information to make reasonable and strategic FCPA self-
reporting decisions from a cost–benefit perspective.  
III.  THE CORPORATE SENTENCING CALCULUS 
Chapter Eight of the Sentencing Guidelines, which governs the 
sentencing of organizations,75 provides incentives for the voluntary 
disclosure of potential FCPA violations.76 Specifically, courts assess the 
culpability of a corporation in a given matter (determined as part of 
calculating the “fine range” under the Sentencing Guidelines) by adding 
up the corporation’s “Culpability Score”—a computation that starts 
with a score of five.77 As a given entity’s Culpability Score increases, so 
does the corresponding fine range. Courts can add points depending 
upon the finding of one or more of the following: (1) “Involvement in or 
Tolerance of Criminal Activity,”78 meaning that “an individual within 
                                                                                                                     
 74. See Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 900 
(2009) (summarizing various theories of bureaucratic motivation and noting that agencies “seek 
to maximize one or some of the following: their budget, neutral expertise, discretion, 
bureaucratic autonomy, or leisure”). 
 75. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8 (2014) [hereinafter 
GUIDELINES MANUAL], available at http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines-manual/2014/2014-
individual-chapters-pdf.  
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. § 8C2.5. 
 78. Id. § 8C2.5 (b). 
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high-level personnel of the organization participated in, condoned, or 
was willfully ignorant of the offense;”79 (2) “Prior History,” meaning 
that the company engaged in similar conduct in the past;80 (3) 
“Violation of an Order,”81 meaning that the offense violated a judicial 
order82 or violated a condition of probation;83 and/or (4) “Obstruction of 
Justice,”84 meaning that the company willfully obstructed justice 
“during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant 
offense.”85 
Courts can also deduct points from the Culpability Score. There can 
be a three-point deduction if the organization’s employees or agents 
violated the FCPA “even though the organization had in place at the 
time of the offense an effective compliance and ethics program.”86 
However, this downward departure is not available if the organization 
delayed reporting the offense.87 In addition, one, two, or five points can 
be taken off the Culpability Score of corporations that self-report, that 
cooperate fully, and that accept responsibility for their wrongdoing.88 If 
the corporation does all three, there is a five-point deduction. If it 
cooperates and accepts responsibility, there is a two-point deduction. If 
it merely accepts responsibility, there is a one-point deduction.89 Thus, 
the “value” of self-reporting is a three-point deduction from the 
corporation’s Culpability Score.  
To determine the corporate fine, however, courts use a five-step 
process involving factors in addition to the Culpability Score. First, they 
compute the seriousness of the offense, which represents the “base 
                                                                                                                     
 79. Id. § 8C2.5 (b) (1) (A) (i). 
 80. Id. § 8C2.5 (c). 
 81. Id. § 8C2.5 (d). 
 82. Id. § 8C2.5 (d) (1). 
 83. Id. § 8C2.5 (d) (2). 
 84. Id. § 8C2.5 (e).  
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. § 8C2.5(f)(1). Some commentators have argued that the Sentencing Guidelines 
have bolstered the creation and expansion of an FCPA compliance industry. See, e.g., Miriam H. 
Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 993–99 (2009). 
 87. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 75, § 8C2.5(f)(2). 
 88. Id. § 8C2.5(g)(1)–(3); see also § 8C2.5(g) cmt. 13 (“[C]ooperation must be both 
timely and thorough. To be timely, the cooperation must begin essentially at the same time as 
the organization is officially notified of a criminal investigation. To be thorough, the 
cooperation should include the disclosure of all pertinent information known by the 
organization. A prime test of whether the organization has disclosed all pertinent information is 
whether the information is sufficient for law enforcement personnel to identify the nature and 
extent of the offense and the individual(s) responsible for the criminal conduct.”). 
 89. Id. § 8C2.5(g)(3). 
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fine.”90 Second, courts assess the company’s culpability by adding up 
the Culpability Score.91  
Third, the court assigns the Culpability Score a minimum and a 
maximum “multiplier.”92 The court then determines the fine range “by 
multiplying the ‘base fine’ calculated under § 8C2.4 by both the 
minimum multiplier calculated under § 8C2.6, which yields the 
minimum of the ‘fine range,’ and by the maximum multiplier calculated 
under § 8C2.6, which yields the maximum of the ‘fine range.’”93  
Fourth, the court may consider a number of other factors, including 
whether the company failed to have an effective compliance program, 
whether there was any non-pecuniary loss caused by the transgression, 
or whether there was any prior corporate misconduct by high-level 
personnel that had not yet been considered.94 The court may also 
differentiate between cases with offenses of varying seriousness and 
with aggravating factors of varying intensity.95 Fifth, the court may 
consider other factors that might lead to an upward or downward 
departure, such as a corporation’s substantial assistance to the 
government in conducting its investigation or in the investigation and 
prosecution of another organization that has potentially committed a 
crime.96 
Reviewing the plea agreements and DPAs of several well-known 
FCPA matters can provide a sense of how these various factors 
influence the final outcomes of the cases, especially with respect to the 
corporate fines. The following seven cases involve some of the largest 
FCPA fines paid in U.S. history—four of the seven cases rank among 
the “top ten” fines ever paid.97 They were all settled in the last ten years, 
and for the sake of space, the discussion will only include the DOJ’s 
                                                                                                                     
 90. Id. § 8C2.4. 
 91. Id. § 8C2.5. 
 92. Id. § 8C2.6. 
 93. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 75, § 8C2.7(a)–(b); see also U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, CHAPTER EIGHT FINE PRIMER: DETERMINING THE 
APPROPRIATE FINE UNDER THE ORGANIZATIONAL GUIDELINES 5 (2013) [hereinafter CHAPTER 
EIGHT FINE PRIMER], available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/primers/
Primer_Organizational_Fines.pdf. As an example, the Chapter Eight primer states: “[A] 
Culpability Score of ten or more results in a minimum multiplier of 2.00 and a maximum 
multiplier of 4.00, while a lower Culpability Score of three results in a minimum multiplier of 
0.60 and a maximum multiplier of 1.20. . . . If the base fine is $85,000 and the Culpability Score 
is five, the ‘base fine’ is multiplied by 1.00 to determine the minimum fine and by 2.00 to 
determine the maximum fine, resulting in a ‘fine range’ of $85,000 to $170,000.” Id. at 5–6. 
 94. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 75, § 8C2.8(a). 
 95. CHAPTER EIGHT FINE PRIMER, supra note 93, at 6; see also GUIDELINES MANUAL, 
supra note 75, § 8C2.8(b). 
 96. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 75, § 8C4.1(a). 
 97. See Cassin, supra note 7.  
20
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 5 [2016], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss5/4
2015] INCENTIVIZING CORPORATE AMERICA TO ERADICATE TRANSNATIONAL BRIBERY 1703 
 
handling of the case even in those instances where the SEC may also 
have arrived at a disposition of the matter.98 In the first three cases 
reviewed, the defendant elected to self-report, while in the next four 
cases, the defendant failed to self-report. 
A.  Three FCPA Cases with Self-Reporting 
This Section discusses the disposition of three cases involving 
FCPA violations in which the defendant self-reported the violation. As 
these cases illustrate, self-reporting does not guarantee a reduction in 
the monetary penalty owed for the transgression. 
1.  United States v. Titan Corp. 
In United States v. Titan Corp.,99 Titan pled guilty to violating anti-
bribery provisions of the FCPA,100 to violating the books and records 
provisions of the FCPA,101 and to aiding or assisting in the filing of a 
fraudulent tax return.102 Titan agreed to pay a criminal fine of 
$13,000,000, which is nearly the maximum of the Sentencing 
Guidelines fine range calculated to be between $6,825,000 and 
$13,650,000.103 
The plea agreement provides very little information regarding how 
the parties decided upon the amount Titan paid as a fine, stating only 
that the fine reflected a consideration of the corporation’s conduct and 
cooperation.104 The agreement also states that in calculating the 
Culpability Score for Titan, the court deducted five points from the 
score in accordance with Section 8C2.5(g)(1) of the Sentencing 
Guidelines for Titan’s self-reporting, cooperation, and acceptance of 
responsibility.105 
2.  United States v. ABB Ltd. 
In United States v. ABB Ltd.,106 the defendant, ABB Ltd., entered 
into a DPA with the DOJ. The government had charged ABB Inc. (a 
                                                                                                                     
 98. See id. 
 99. See Plea Agreement, United States v. Titan Corp. (S.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2005) (No. 05-
CR-314-BEN), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/titan-corp/03-01-
05titan-plea.pdf.  
 100. Specifically, with violating 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1. Id. at 2. 
 101. Specifically, with violating 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2)(A) and 78m(b)(5). Id. 
 102. Specifically, with violating 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2). Id. 
 103. Id. at 23, 25. 
 104. Id. at 25. 
 105. Id.  
 106. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. ABB Ltd. (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 
2010) (No. 410-cr-00665), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/abb/
09-29-10abbjordan-dpa.pdf. 
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subsidiary of ABB Ltd.) with violating the anti-bribery provisions of the 
FCPA,107 and had charged ABB Ltd.-Jordan (another subsidiary of 
ABB Ltd.) with both wire fraud and violation of the books and records 
provisions of the FCPA.108 As part of the DPA, ABB Ltd. agreed to pay 
a total monetary penalty of $30,420,000, which is the very bottom of the 
combined Sentencing Guidelines fine range calculated to be between 
$30,420,000 and $60,200,000.109  
The DPA provides very little information regarding how the parties 
decided upon the monetary penalty, stating only that the amount was 
proper due to ABB Ltd.’s “extraordinary cooperation” in the matter, 
including sharing information with the DOJ “regarding evidence 
obtained as a result of ABB Ltd.’s extensive investigation of corrupt 
payments made by ABB subsidiaries in various countries around the 
world.”110 
3.  Johnson & Johnson 
In the matter of Johnson & Johnson (J&J),111 J&J entered into a 
DPA with the DOJ. The government had charged DePuy, Inc. (a 
subsidiary of J&J) with violating the anti-bribery provisions of the 
FCPA.112 As part of the DPA, J&J agreed to pay a total monetary 
penalty of $21,400,000, which is a 25% reduction off the bottom of the 
Sentencing Guidelines fine range calculated to be between $28,500,000 
and $57,000,000.113  
The DPA provides very little information regarding how the parties 
decided upon the monetary penalty, stating only that the amount was 
appropriate given J&J’s “voluntary and thorough disclosure of the 
misconduct at issue, the nature and extent of J&J’s cooperation in [the] 
matter, penalties related to the same conduct in Greece and the United 
Kingdom, J&J’s cooperation in the Justice Department’s investigation 
of other companies, and J&J’s extraordinary remediation.”114 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 107. Specifically, with violating 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Id. at 1–2. 
 108. Specifically, with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1343 and 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2)(A), 
78m(b)(5), and 78ff(a). Id.  
 109. See id. at 9–12. 
 110. Id. at 12. 
 111. Deferred Prosecution Agreement Between Johnson & Johnson, et al. and U.S. Dept. 
of Justice, Criminal Division, Jan. 14, 2011, available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ fraud/ 
fcpa/cases/depuy-inc/04-08-11depuy-dpa.pdf. 
 112. Specifically, with violating 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Id. 
 113. Id. at 5. 
 114. Id. 
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B.  Four FCPA Cases Without Self-Reporting 
This Section discusses four cases involving FCPA violations in 
which the defendant failed to self-report. These cases illustrate that 
failing to self-report does not necessarily mean that there will be no 
reduction in the monetary penalty owed for the offense. 
1.  United States v. Alstom S.A. 
In United States v. Alstom S.A.,115 the defendant pled guilty to one 
count of violating the books and records provisions of the FCPA and 
one count of violating the internal controls provisions of the FCPA.116 
The defendant agreed to pay a criminal fine of $772,290,000, which is 
quite close to the middle of the Sentencing Guidelines fine range 
calculated to be between $532,800,000 and $1,065,600,000.117  
With respect to “failure to self-report,” the plea agreement stated 
that the defendant failed to voluntarily disclose its conduct “even 
though it was aware of related misconduct at Alstom Power, Inc., a U.S. 
subsidiary, which entered into a resolution for corrupt conduct in 
connection with a power project in Italy several years prior to the 
[Justice] Department reaching out to Alstom regarding its 
investigation.”118 
The DOJ, in accordance with the agency’s Principles of Prosecution, 
considered several factors in determining the outcome of the case, 
including (1) Alstom’s cooperation with the investigation; (2) the nature 
and seriousness of Alstom’s offense; (3) Alstom’s compliance and 
remediation; and (4) Alstom’s prior criminal misconduct. 
With respect to “cooperation,” the defendant objected to cooperating 
with the DOJ’s investigation for the first full year. The defendant then 
started cooperating to a certain extent, but nonetheless impeded the 
investigation by not cooperating fully.119 The defendant eventually 
began to provide “thorough cooperation,” including assisting the DOJ in 
investigating and prosecuting individuals and companies involved with 
the defendant.120 However, this kind of cooperation did not begin until 
after the DOJ charged several Alstom employees and executives.121 
                                                                                                                     
 115. See Plea Agreement, United States v. Alstom S.A., (D. Conn. Dec. 22, 2014) (No. 
3:14-cr-00246-JBA), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/
attachments/2014/12/22/alstom_sa_plea_agreement.pdf.  
 116. Id. at 1–2. 
 117. Id. at 12. 
 118. Id. at 13. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 13–14. 
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With respect to the “nature and seriousness of the offense,” the 
transgression took place over multiple years and involved bribing high-
level government officials.122 It also involved falsifying books and 
records and failing to maintain adequate controls to prevent bribe 
payments.123 
With respect to “compliance and remediation,” Alstom did not have 
an effective compliance program at the time of the transgression but 
later made major efforts to improve its program and remediate 
problems, thereby “substantially increasing its compliance staff, 
improving its alert procedures, increasing training and auditing/testing, 
and ceasing the use of external success fee-based consultants.”124 With 
respect to “prior criminal misconduct,” the plea agreement states that 
the corporation, through its subsidiaries, “entered into resolutions with 
various other governments and the World Bank relating to similar 
misconduct.”125 
2.  United States v. Siemens 
In United States v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft,126 Siemens AG and 
its subsidiaries Siemens, S.A. (Argentina), Siemens Bangladesh Ltd., 
and Siemens, S.A. (Venezuela) pled guilty to violating the FCPA’s 
internal controls provisions as well as the FCPA’s books and records 
provisions.127 Siemens Argentina pled guilty to violating the books and 
records provisions of the FCPA, and Siemens Bangladesh and Siemens 
Venezuela each pled guilty to violating both the FCPA’s anti-bribery 
provisions as well as the books and records provisions.128 
The defendants agreed to pay a criminal fine of $450,000,000, which 
is substantially below the minimum of the Sentencing Guidelines fine 
range calculated to be between $1.35 billion and $2.70 billion.129 
The DOJ, in accordance with the agency’s Principles of 
Prosecution,130 considered various factors in the overall disposition of 
the case, including (1) Siemens’ cooperation and remediation efforts; 
(2) the potential disproportionate harm to the shareholders, pension 
                                                                                                                     
 122.  Id. at 14. 
 123. Id.  
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See Department’s Sentencing Memorandum, United States v. Siemens 
Aktiengesellschaft, (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008) (No. 1:08-cr-00367-RJL), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2008/12/19/siemens-sentencing-memo.pdf.  
 127. Specifically, with violating 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m (b)(2)(B), 78m(b)(5), and 78ff(a). Id. at 
10. 
 128. Id.  
 129. Id. at 10, 12. 
 130. UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 50, at 9-28.300. 
24
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 5 [2016], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss5/4
2015] INCENTIVIZING CORPORATE AMERICA TO ERADICATE TRANSNATIONAL BRIBERY 1707 
 
holders, employees, the public, and any other innocent third parties that 
the case could impact; (3) whether and to what extent Siemens faced a 
risk of debarment from government contracts; and (4) related cases of 
other governmental authorities.131 
With respect to Siemens’ “substantial assistance, cooperation, and 
remediation efforts,” the sentencing memorandum states that the 
penalties are appropriate based on how Siemens substantially assisted 
the DOJ in related investigations, helped uncover evidence of prior 
corruption within the company, and committed to remediate its 
operations and improve transparency.132 With respect to “voluntary 
disclosure,” the sentencing memorandum states that Siemens failed to 
self-disclose and thus only received a two-point deduction to its 
Culpability Score—“which is incongruent with the level of cooperation 
and assistance provided by the company in the [DOJ’s] 
investigation.”133 
3.  United States v. Alcoa World Alumina LLC 
In United States v. Alcoa World Alumina LLC,134 the defendant pled 
guilty to violating the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA.135 Alcoa 
agreed to pay a criminal fine of $209,000,000, which is substantially 
below the minimum of the Sentencing Guidelines fine range calculated 
to be between $446,000,000 and $892,000,000.136 The plea agreement 
stated that the fine was appropriate based on the following factors: 
(1) the potential effect of a penalty on Alcoa’s financial 
condition and ability to compete, “including, but not 
limited to, its ability to fund its sustaining and improving 
capital expenditures, its ability to invest in research and 
development, its ability to fund its pension obligations, and 
its ability to maintain necessary cash reserves to fund its 
operations and meet its liabilities;”137 
(2) the large remedy that the SEC imposed on the 
Defendant’s majority shareholder, Alcoa, for its 
                                                                                                                     
 131. Id. at 11. 
 132. Id. at 15. 
 133. Id. at 16. 
 134. See Plea Agreement, United States v. Alcoa World Alumina LLC (W.D. Penn. Jan. 9, 
2014) (Criminal No. 14-7), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/alcoa-
world-alumina/01-09-2014plea-agreement.pdf. 
 135. Specifically, with violating 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Id. ¶ 1. 
 136. Id. ¶¶ 7, 34. 
 137. Id. ¶ 35. 
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involvement;138 
(3) the appointment of a Special Committee by Alcoa’s 
Board of Directors “to oversee an internal investigation by 
independent counsel;”139 
(4) the “substantial cooperation” provided by Alcoa, 
including “conducting an extensive internal investigation, 
voluntarily making employees available for interviews, and 
collecting, analyzing, and organizing voluminous evidence 
and information” for the DOJ;140 
(5) the efforts by Alcoa to remediate the problems, which 
included hiring ethics and compliance officers, as well as 
implementing improved due diligence reviews;141 and 
(6) Alcoa’s commitment to maintaining an effective anti-
corruption compliance program.142 
4.  United States v. Daimler AG 
In United States v. Daimler AG, Daimler AG and its subsidiaries 
DaimlerChrysler China Ltd. (DCCL), DaimlerChrysler Automotive 
Russia SAO (DCAR), and Daimler Export and Trade Finance GmbH 
(ETF) pled guilty to violating the books and records provisions of the 
FCPA.143 The three subsidiaries—DCCL, DCAR, and ETF—pled guilty 
to violating the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA.144 Daimler AG and 
its subsidiaries agreed to pay a total criminal fine of $93,600,000, which 
is approximately 20% below the minimum of the Sentencing Guidelines 
fine range calculated to be between $116,000,000 and $232,000,000.145 
The DOJ, in accordance with the Principles of Prosecution, 
considered multiple factors when deciding the case, including (1) 
Daimler’s cooperation and remediation efforts; (2) the potential 
disproportionate harm to shareholders, pension holders, employees, the 
public, and any other innocent third parties that the case could impact; 
                                                                                                                     
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Specifically, with violating 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2)(A), 78m(b)(5), and 78ff(a) as well 
as 18 U.S.C. § 2. United States’ Sentencing Memorandum at 12, United States v. Daimler AG, 
(D.D.C. Mar. 24, 2010) (No. 1:10-cr-00063-RJL), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/
fraud/fcpa/cases/daimler/03-24-10daimlerag-sent.pdf. 
 144. Specifically, with violating 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3. Daimler AG, 1:10-cr-00063-RJL, at 
12–13. 
 145. Id. at 14. 
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(3) whether and to what extent the defendants faced a risk of debarment 
from government contracts, particularly “European Union Directive 
2004/18/EC, which provides that companies convicted of corruption 
offenses shall be mandatorily excluded from government contracts in all 
EU countries.”146 
With respect to “cooperation,” the sentencing memorandum states 
that the lower fine amount is appropriate due to Daimler’s cooperation 
in the DOJ investigation, such as revealing information about company 
corruption in other countries.147 With respect to “voluntary disclosure,” 
Daimler only received a two-point reduction in its Culpability Score 
because it failed to self-report.148 The DOJ submitted that the point 
reduction was “incongruent with the level of cooperation and 
assistance” the company provided in DOJ’s investigation.149 
C.  Observations from the Seven Cases 
In reviewing the disposition of these seven FCPA cases, it seems 
clear that voluntary disclosure does not guarantee a reduction in 
monetary penalties. Moreover, the failure to voluntarily disclose does 
not preclude a corporation from receiving a reduction in monetary 
penalties. Indeed, in both Siemens and Daimler AG, the sentencing 
memorandum states that because the defendant failed to self-report the 
matter, it would only receive a two-point reduction in its Culpability 
Score.150 In both cases, however, the DOJ went on to state that such an 
outcome was “incongruent with the level of cooperation and assistance 
provided by the company in the Department’s investigation,” and the 
defendant ultimately paid a fine substantially below the minimum of the 
Sentencing Guidelines fine range. 151 
These conclusions comport well with conclusions arrived at by other 
FCPA scholars and researchers. For example, Professors Stephen Choi 
and Kevin Davis, both faculty members of the New York University 
School of Law, together conducted a quantitative analysis on a dataset 
of FCPA cases resolved from 2004 to 2011. The scholars wanted to 
determine if mitigating activity (whether self-disclosure, cooperation, or 
                                                                                                                     
 146. Id. at 12. 
 147. Id. at 14. 
  148. Id.  
 149. Id.  
 150. Sentencing Memorandum at 16, United States v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, (D.D.C. 
Dec. 12, 2008) (No. 1:08-cr-00367-RJL), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2014/12/22/alstom_sa_plea_agreement.pdf; United 
States’ Sentencing Memorandum, at 14, United States v. Daimler AG, (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 2010) 
(No. 1:10-cr-00063-RJL), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/
daimler/03-24-10daimlerag-sent.pdf. 
 151. Sentencing Memorandum, Daimler AG (No. 1:10-cr-00063-RJL), at 14. 
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remediation) conducted by a given transgressing company led to 
reduced sanctions by the federal government.152 After controlling for 
important effects such as bribe amount, these investigators found “no 
evidence to support the hypothesis that voluntary disclosure or 
cooperation or remediation correlates with reduced total monetary 
penalties.”153  
Professors Choi and Davis analyzed the data using several different 
models, each with different variables.154 Still, these scholars ultimately 
arrived at the same conclusion: “[O]ur results do not support the view 
that mitigating activities correlate with reduced FCPA penalties . . . .”155 
Moreover, two other commentators arrived at similar findings. After 
analyzing forty FCPA cases from 2002 to 2009, researcher Bruce 
Hinchey concluded that “[t]he data evaluated here . . . give[s] support to 
the notion that there is no benefit to voluntary disclosure in the 
published cases.”156 Researcher Bruce Klaw concluded that “even when 
companies do voluntarily disclose, a vast majority are nonetheless 
subjected to substantial sanctions.”157 Specifically, Klaw concluded that 
of those companies that self-reported FCPA violations to the DOJ and 
SEC from the late 1990s to 2007, 86% of them subsequently faced 
government enforcement action.158  
Practitioners at a leading law firm arrived at a conclusion that 
appears to square well with these findings. These attorneys stated that 
while the DOJ and SEC threaten harsher penalties for corporations that 
fail to self-report, “the objective evidence and the experience of 
investigative and defense counsel during investigations suggest that the 
outcome of an investigation depends most heavily on the seriousness of 
the underlying facts, and less on whether or not the company self-
reported those facts.”159 
                                                                                                                     
 152. Stephen J. Choi & Kevin E. Davis, Foreign Affairs and Enforcement of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act 20 (Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series Working Paper 
No. 12–35, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2116487.  
 153. Id. at 20. 
 154. Id. at 23. 
 155. Id. at 24. 
 156. Bruce Hinchey, Punishing the Penitent: Disproportionate Fines in Recent FCPA 
Enforcements and Suggested Improvements, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 393, 399, 415 (2011) (emphasis 
added). 
 157. Bruce W. Klaw, A New Strategy for Preventing Bribery and Extortion in International 
Business Transactions, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 303, 338 (2012). 
 158. Id. at 338–39. 
 159. Charles Carberry et al., DOJ/SEC’s Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act: Jones Day Summary and Analysis, JONES DAY (Dec. 2012), 
http://www.jonesday.com/doj_sec_resource_guide_to_fcpa/ (emphasis added); see also F. 
Joseph Warin & Jason A. Monahan, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Due Diligence and 
Voluntary Disclosure, J. PAYMENT SYS. L. 433 (2005) (noting that “voluntary disclosure of an 
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IV.  SELF-REPORTING AND THE RALPH LAUREN CORPORATION 
While it is not ranked among the larger FCPA cases in terms of fine 
size (as were the seven cases just discussed), the Ralph Lauren matter is 
nevertheless important to review because of the largely uniform reaction 
to the case by experts and commentators. Specifically, the disposition of 
the matter is said to stand for the proposition that self-reporting’s 
substantial benefits make it the most strategic course of action.160 This 
Article challenges that assertion. 
On April 22, 2013, the SEC announced an NPA with Ralph Lauren 
Corporation in connection with bribes paid to government officials in 
Argentina.161 After Ralph Lauren Corporation uncovered the 
misconduct through an internal audit, it promptly self-reported it to the 
SEC.162 The SEC did not charge the corporation with violations of the 
FCPA because of the company’s response to the situation, which 
included self-reporting promptly, providing thorough information to the 
SEC, and cooperating in the SEC investigation.163  
In announcing the decision, the acting Director of the SEC’s 
Enforcement Division commended the company for its actions, stating: 
“When they found a problem, Ralph Lauren Corporation did the right 
thing by immediately reporting it to the SEC and providing exceptional 
assistance in our investigation.”164 He added, “The NPA in this matter 
makes clear that we will confer substantial and tangible benefits on 
companies that respond appropriately to violations and cooperate fully 
with the SEC.”165 Other experts and commentators arrived at similar 
assessments of the matter, with headlines such as “Ralph Lauren Case 
Shows the Benefits of Cooperation,”166 “Another Example of the 
                                                                                                                     
FCPA violation does not guarantee mitigation of civil and criminal penalties. Furthermore, the 
SEC and DOJ may give greater weight to voluntary disclosure in some cases . . . than in other 
cases”), available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/fstore/documents/pubs/Warin-Monahan-
FCPA-JPSL09.05.pdf. 
 160. See, e.g., Shannon Walker, A Case for Self-Reporting - Ralph Lauren Ethics Violation 
Experience, WHISTLEBLOWER SEC., http://blog.whistleblowersecurity.com/blog/bid/288041/A-
Case-for-Self-Reporting-Ralph-Lauren-Ethics-Violation-Experience (last visited July 22, 2015).  
 161. Press Release, SEC Announces Non-Prosecution Agreement with Ralph Lauren 
Corporation Involving FCPA Misconduct, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Apr. 22, 2013) [hereinafter 
Ralph Lauren Press Release], available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/
PressRelease/1365171514780#.UrUm3ZqA2M8. 
 162. Id.  
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. (emphasis added). 
 166. Peter J. Henning, Ralph Lauren Case Shows the Benefits of Cooperation, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 29, 2013, 12:47 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/04/29/ralph-lauren-case-shows-
the-benefits-of-cooperation/?_r=0. 
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Benefits of FCPA Self-Reporting,”167 “Self-Reporting FCPA Violations 
Pays Off: Just Ask Ralph Lauren,”168 and “Contrite Companies Can Be 
Forgiven in Bribery Cases: Enforcers Look Kindly on Bribery Suspects 
That ‘Fess Up.’”169 
A.  The Case Against Ralph Lauren Corporation 
As outlined by the SEC, Ralph Lauren Corporation’s Argentine 
subsidiary paid bribes to customs and government officials to assist in 
importing products into Argentina.170 Paid through the company’s 
customs broker, the bribes were to avoid necessary paperwork and to 
avoid the inspection of prohibited products by customs officials.171 The 
bribes to Argentine officials totaled $593,000 over a four-year period.172 
Under the NPA, the company agreed to pay $593,000 in disgorgement 
and $141,845.79 in prejudgment interest.173 
Upon discovering the bribes, the company took immediate steps to 
halt the wrongdoing, such as terminating its customs broker.174 
Furthermore, the corporation reviewed its preexisting FCPA compliance 
program and implemented measures to upgrade the program, including: 
(1) amending the company anticorruption policy and translating it into 
eight languages; (2) enhancing third-party due diligence procedures; (3) 
modernizing policies for both gifts and commissions; and (4) 
implementing employee anticorruption training.175 The company also 
stopped retail operations in Argentina and began to end all other 
operations there.176  
Ralph Lauren Corporation also provided extensive cooperation to the 
SEC and the DOJ, including providing a complete production (and 
translation) of documents and disclosure of large amounts of 
                                                                                                                     
 167. Jonathan Green, Another Example of the Benefits of FCPA Self-Reporting, LAW360 
(Apr. 24, 2013, 2:41 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/435727/another-example-of-the-
benefits-of-fcpa-self-reporting. 
 168. Self-Reporting FCPA Violations Pays Off: Just Ask Ralph Lauren, JDSUPRA (Apr. 24, 
2013), http://compliance.jdsupra.com/post/48778054353/self-reporting-fcpa-violations-pays-
off-just-ask-ralph. 
 169. Amanda Bronstad, Contrite Companies Can Be Forgiven in Bribery Cases: Enforcers 
Look Kindly on Bribery Suspects That ‘Fess Up,’ THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, May 15, 2013. 
 170. Ralph Lauren Press Release, supra note 161.  
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Non-Prosecution Agreement at Statement of Facts (Exhibit A) ¶ 12, U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n and Ralph Lauren Corporation (Apr. 22, 2013) [hereinafter Ralph Lauren NPA], 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2013/2013-65-npa.pdf. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
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information pertaining to its bribery activities in Argentina; making 
witnesses available for interviews; and conducting an FCPA internal 
review and risk assessment of its operations in Hong Kong, Italy, and 
Japan, where no further transgressions were identified.177 
B.  Resolving Ralph Lauren Using a Non-Prosecution Agreement 
Rather than indictment and trial, both the DOJ and SEC resolved the 
Ralph Lauren matter through the use of NPAs. This is not unusual, as 
the government resolves the vast majority of FCPA matters through 
NPAs and DPAs; in fact, in the last twenty years, very few defendants 
have gone to trial in FCPA matters.178 According to the DOJ, DPAs and 
NPAs “occupy an important middle ground between declining [to 
prosecute on the one hand] and obtaining [a] conviction [on the 
other].”179 The fate of the accounting firm Arthur Andersen LLP 
probably instilled within both prosecutors and corporations the belief 
that serious collateral consequences surround corporate prosecutions.180 
Many commentators have suggested that the “mere indictment” of 
Arthur Andersen led to its closing—in the end, 28,000 people lost their 
jobs.181 Indeed, it was partly the repercussions from the collapse of 
Arthur Andersen that led the DOJ to “no longer see[] its role in the 
corporate context as solely that of indicting, prosecuting, and punishing. 
                                                                                                                     
 177. Id. 
 178. See Mike Koehler, FCPA 101: How Are FCPA Enforcement Actions Typically 
Resolved?, FCPA PROFESSOR, http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-101#q16 (last visited July 22, 
2015) [hereinafter Koehler, FCPA 101] (“Nearly every FCPA enforcement action against a 
company in this new era of FCPA enforcement is resolved through a non-prosecution 
agreement . . . or a deferred prosecution agreement . . . .”). 
 179. General Considerations of Corporate Liability, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-
28.200, available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/
28mcrm.htm; see also Greenblum, supra note 8 (“Deferred prosecution offers prosecutors an 
intermediate option between declination and plea bargaining, as deferrals exact sanctions while 
circumventing the collateral consequences of a conviction.” (citation omitted)). 
 180. See generally Indictment, United States v. Arthur Anderson, LLP, No. CRH-02-121 
(S.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2002). 
 181. Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations Revisited: Lessons of the Arthur 
Andersen Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107, 107 (2006); see also Elkan Abramowitz & 
Barry A. Bohrer, The Debate About Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements, 248 N.Y. L.J. 
(2012) (“While the reality is that corporations may not face the type of collateral consequences 
suffered by Arthur Andersen, there is no question that fighting criminal charges can have a 
tremendous impact on a corporation’s reputation and pocketbook.”). But see Gabriel Markoff, 
Arthur Andersen and the Myth of the Corporate Death Penalty: Corporate Criminal 
Convictions in the Twenty-First Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 797, 802 (2013) (challenging 
prevailing notions regarding the collateral consequences of convicting corporate entities). Using 
a database of organizational convictions, Gabriel Markoff comes to the conclusion that, from 
2001 to 2010, no publicly traded company failed due to a conviction.  
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Instead it is a vehicle effecting widespread structural reform within 
corrupt corporate cultures.”182 
C.  The Fairness of Non-Prosecution Agreements 
However, using DPAs and NPAs in resolving FCPA matters may 
have a significant drawback: Companies may sometimes go along with 
a DPA or NPA not because of actual wrongdoing or guilt, but rather 
because they want to avoid the possibility of a negative outcome at trial. 
As one commentator puts it:  
 
[T]he ugly truth is that while the existence of [NPAs and 
DPAs] can be welcome alternatives to an indictment, 
combined with a virtually strict liability regime, they can 
also permit the government to exact millions of dollars in 
fines from companies that are genuinely without fault but 
cannot afford to take the risk of an adverse outcome if they 
take on the government.183  
 
Another commentator suggests the current dynamic means that 
corporate entities have “little practical choice” when faced with 
choosing between indictment or accepting a DPA or an NPA.184 He 
argues that this gives the government “enormous leverage” when 
negotiating terms of the agreements, which can in turn result in 
“prosecutorial overreaching” and deals that are unfair to corporate 
defendants.185 
In looking at the “deal terms” of such agreements, NPAs and DPAs 
oftentimes require (1) significant and long-term governance changes 
within the corporate entity, (2) admission of wrongdoing by the 
company, (3) acceptance of a “statement of facts” setting forth the 
company’s wrongful behavior, and (4) a prohibition upon the company 
                                                                                                                     
 182. Thomas, supra note 35, at 454. 
 183. Jon May, The New British Invasion: Will the UK Bribery Act of 2010 Eclipse the 
FCPA?, 36 CHAMPION 28, 31 (2012) (emphasis added) (quoting National Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers Director of White Collar Policy, Shana-Tara Regon).  
 184. Matt Senko, Prosecutorial Overreaching in Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 19 S. 
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 163, 163–64 (2009); see also Barry J. Pollack & Annie Wartanian 
Reisinger, Lone Wolf or the Start of a New Pack: Should the FCPA Guidance Represent a New 
Paradigm in Evaluating Corporate Criminal Liability Risks? 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121, 125 
(2014) (“[A]s reluctant as the DOJ has become post-Arthur Andersen to prosecute criminal 
charges against corporations, corporations have become even more reluctant to defend against 
such charges. The result is that criminal charges or potential criminal charges against 
corporations are almost always resolved by a negotiated resolution rather than through 
litigation.”). 
 185. Senko, supra note 184, at 163–64. 
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against making public statements that contradict admissions made in the 
agreement.186 In the Ralph Lauren case, the company agreed to similar 
significant and ongoing obligations. In addition to agreeing to pay 
$593,000 in disgorgement and $141,845.79 in prejudgment interest,187 
the corporation agreed to the following “cooperation” duties: 
1. The Respondent, a corporation organized and operating 
under the laws of Delaware, agrees to cooperate fully and 
truthfully in the Investigation and any other related 
enforcement litigation or proceeding to which the 
Commission is a party (the “Proceedings”), regardless of 
the time period in which the cooperation is required. In 
addition, the Respondent agrees to cooperate fully and 
truthfully, when directed by the Division's staff, in an 
official investigation or proceeding by any federal, state, or 
self-regulatory organization (“Other Proceedings”). The 
full, truthful, and continuing cooperation of the Respondent 
shall include, but not be limited to:  
a. producing, in a responsive and prompt manner, all 
non-privileged documents, information, and other 
materials to the Commission as requested by the 
Division's staff, wherever located, in the possession, 
custody, or control of the Respondent;  
b. using its best efforts to secure the full, truthful, and 
continuing cooperation, as defined in Paragraph 3, of 
current and former directors, officers, employees and 
agents, including making these persons available, when 
requested to do so by the Division's staff, at its expense, 
for interviews and the provision of testimony in the 
investigation, trial and other judicial proceedings in 
connection with the Proceedings or Other Proceedings; 
and  
c. entering into tolling agreements, when requested to 
do so by the Division's staff, during the period of 
cooperation.  
 
2. The full, truthful, and continuing cooperation of each 
                                                                                                                     
 186. Jonathan S. Sack & Elizabeth Haines, Be Careful What You Wish For: How Deferred 
and Non-Prosecution Agreements Can Be Used in Civil Litigation, BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 10, 
2012), available at http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-contributions/deferred-and-non-
prosecution-agreements/. 
 187. See Ralph Lauren Press Release, supra note 161.  
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person described in Paragraph 2 above will be subject to 
the procedures and protections of this paragraph, and 
shall include, but not be limited to:  
a. producing all non-privileged documents and other 
materials as requested by the Division's staff;  
 
b. appearing for interviews, at such times and places, 
as requested by the Division's staff;  
c. responding to all inquiries, when requested to do so 
by the Division's staff, in connection with the 
Proceedings or Other Proceedings; and  
d. testifying at trial and other judicial proceedings, 
when requested to do so by the Division's staff, in 
connection with the Proceedings or Other Proceedings.188  
 
Are these obligations unreasonably burdensome, vague, or expansive? 
How much time and money will the company spend to comply with 
these terms of the NPA agreement? While only the Ralph Lauren 
Corporation can accurately determine whether the obligations cross the 
line into being unfair or overreaching, one commentator has argued that 
prosecutors, in crafting DPAs and NPAs, tend to employ “nonspecific 
terms” that provide government investigators with “broad authority to 
compel disclosure of information and force internal changes, while 
leaving companies virtually defenseless.”189 He further suggests that 
such terms “clearly favor the prosecutor” and that defendant companies 
agree to them only because “they have no ammunition at the bargaining 
table.”190  
Perhaps increased judicial review of these agreements would provide 
more protection for companies during the negotiation process. Unlike 
DPAs, NPAs are not filed with a court of law, thereby escaping judicial 
scrutiny that ensures the agreement is reasonable and fair. I have argued 
in a separate article that judicial review should be incorporated into the 
agreement-making processes of both NPAs and DPAs.191 After all, if 
                                                                                                                     
 188. Ralph Lauren NPA, supra note 174, at ¶¶ 2–3. 
 189. Senko, supra note 184, at 184. 
 190. Id. at 177–78. 
 191. Peter Reilly, Negotiating Bribery: Toward Increased Transparency, Consistency, and 
Fairness in Pretrial Bargaining Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 10 HASTINGS BUS. 
L.J. 347, 394 (2014) (“With increased judicial review, not only would there be a more 
reasonable balance of power between prosecutors and corporations during the negotiation phase 
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the government can choose to negotiate a DPA that will be subject to 
judicial scrutiny or can instead choose to negotiate an NPA that 
bypasses judicial review and scrutiny altogether, it will have an 
increased incentive to rely upon NPAs. Thus, both forms of agreements 
should be subject to judicial review. 
V.  TOWARD AN FCPA SELF-REPORTING CALCULUS 
The decision of whether to self-report a potential FCPA violation is 
a strategically difficult one.192 There can be certain advantages to self-
reporting. First, doing so allows a company to frame the issues and set a 
tone for positive interaction with the government. This can include 
emphasizing the strength and effectiveness of the company’s 
compliance programs, policies, and procedures, as well as its 
willingness to cooperate with the government.193 As one FCPA expert 
put it, a voluntary disclosure “allow[s] the company to determine the 
disclosure’s timing, waiting until it has fully investigated the violation 
and undertaken remedial steps, thus showing a pro-active commitment 
to compliance.”194 Another expert adds: 
 
[S]elf-reporting impacts the dynamic between the company 
and the U.S. government throughout the course of the 
review. Self-reporting casts current management and the 
board of directors in the best possible light under difficult 
circumstances, giving defense counsel an opportunity to 
                                                                                                                     
of NPA and DPA deal making, but companies would be provided with guidance on how some 
of the more vague FCPA provisions . . . will be construed by the courts. Moreover, judicial 
review would ensure that DOJ’s claims and theories of corporate wrongdoing actually stand on 
firm legal ground. Essentially, reviewing judges would help to locate and define that heretofore 
elusive line separating lawful from unlawful conduct, thereby providing more certainty in both 
FCPA compliance and enforcement.” (footnotes omitted)). See also Candice Zierdt & Ellen S. 
Podgor, Corporate Deferred Prosecutions Through the Looking Glass of Contract Policing, 96 
KY. L.J. 1, 14 (2007) (“Although negotiated resolutions offer enormous economic benefit, the 
omission of judicial oversight raises concerns when the determination of whether there is a 
breach of the agreement rests within the exclusive province of one party, and that party is the 
government, a party with extraordinary power.”). 
 192. See Richard Marshall, Uuuhhh, Look, We Messed Up Here, CORP. COUNSEL, Jan. 28, 
2010, available at https://www.ropesgray.com/~/media/Files/articles/2010/02/insights-for-in-
house-counsel-grappling-with-self-reporting.ashx (“The decision to self-report [an FCPA 
matter] can be one of the most important decisions the company can make, and such important 
decisions should never be made without careful reflection.”). 
 193. See Marsha Gerber et al., Voluntary Disclosure of FCPA Violations, 43 REV. SEC. & 
COMMODITIES REG. 55, 63 (2010) (“[V]oluntary disclosure presents a tone of cooperation and 
commitment to FCPA compliance.”). 
 194. See id. 
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show the government at the very start of the review that the 
company wishes “to do the right thing.”195  
 
The government appears to agree with these assessments: Stephen L. 
Cohen, Associate Director of the SEC’s Enforcement Division, has 
stated that “[n]othing sets the tone differently than self-reporting versus 
a phone call from us.”196 
Second, companies might wish to reap the benefits of self-reporting 
given that “[t]he risk of getting caught . . . is greater today than any 
point previously.”197 As the SEC Enforcement Director Andrew 
Ceresney put it: “Given all the means that we have for finding out about 
misconduct . . . companies that choose not to self-report are taking a 
significant gamble.”198 If the violation will likely come to light 
regardless, then why not get credit for self-reporting? One reason for the 
increased risk of “getting caught” is the whistleblower provisions 
passed in 2011 as part of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
                                                                                                                     
 195. Carberry, et al., supra note 159; see also Mary Jo White, Chairwoman, Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, Speech Before the Stanford University Rock Center for Corporate Governance: A 
Few Things Directors Should Know About the SEC (June 23, 2014) available at 
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370542148863#.VQjRQU10zcs (“The tone 
and substance of the early communications we have with a company are critical in establishing 
the tenor of our investigations and how the staff and the [SEC] will view your cooperation in the 
final stages of an investigation.”). 
 196. Emmanuel Olaoye, Companies Will Be Treated Favorably If They Report Violations 
First, SEC Enforcer Tells Lawyers, KNOWLEDGE EFFECT (Oct. 24, 2012), http://blog. 
thomsonreuters.com/index.php/companies-will-be-treated-favorably-if-they-report-violations-
first-sec-enforcer-tells-lawyers/. 
 197. Andrew Ramonas, The Perils of Keeping FCPA Infractions Under Wraps, CORP. 
COUNSEL, Oct. 29, 2013 (quoting Charles Duross, then-deputy chief of DOJ’s FCPA unit, at the 
2013 Los Angeles Association of Corporate Counsel’s Annual Meeting), available at 
http://www.law.com/corporatecounsel/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202625548922&slreturn=201311
30211025; see also Timothy P. Peterson & Robertson Park, Regulatory: Deciding Whether to 
Voluntarily Disclose a Potential FCPA Violation, INSIDE COUNSEL (May 29, 2013), available at 
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/05/29/regulatory-deciding-whether-to-voluntarily-disclos 
(“Companies must assume that the probability is greater now that a corruption issue will come 
to the government’s attention, regardless of whether the company itself makes a voluntary 
disclosure, and must take that assumption into account in any calculations regarding the 
potential need for self-reporting.”). 
 198. See Ensign, supra note 4 (quoting an e-mail communication from Mr. Ceresney); 
see also Marhsall L. Miller, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, 
U.S. DOJ, Remarks at the Global Investigation Review Program (Sept. 17, 2014), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/remarks-principal-deputy-assistant-attorney-general-
criminal-division-marshall-l-miller (discussing the employment of enforcement tools “that may 
not have been used frequently enough in white collar cases in past years[,]” including wire taps, 
body wires, border searches, and physical surveillance). Miller reports that these “proactive 
investigative tools—previously used primarily in organized crime and drug cases—have become 
a staple in our white collar investigations.” Id.  
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Consumer Protection Act.199 Under that law, monetary awards 
incentivize whistleblowers to be the first to report a violation. 
Specifically, “the [program] rewards high-quality original information 
that results in an SEC enforcement action with sanctions exceeding $1 
million.”200 Awards can range from 10%–30% of the money collected 
in a case.201  
There are also policies written to incentivize culpable individuals to 
report violations. While outright amnesty is unavailable to such 
whistleblowers, the SEC will consider their efforts pursuant to its Policy 
Statement on Cooperation.202 Overall, the program seems to have 
increased in popularity: the number of whistleblower tips the SEC 
receives annually increased from 3001 in fiscal year 2012, to 3620 in 
fiscal year 2014.203 Since the program’s inception, the SEC has 
authorized awards to fourteen whistleblowers—nine of them in fiscal 
year 2014.204 On September 22, 2014, the SEC authorized the largest 
award made by the program to date: more than $30 million to an 
unidentified whistleblower who revealed ongoing fraud that the 
government may not have detected without that help.205 Such awards 
will likely lead to increased publicity for the program, as well as 
increasing numbers of leads and tips.  
Companies also discover potential FCPA violations during 
increasingly aggressive mergers and acquisitions (M&A) due 
diligence.206 When they find violations, the acquiring firm oftentimes 
requires the target firm to self-disclose the violation to the government 
so it can be fully addressed (i.e., they can pay monetary penalties, fire or 
reprimand personnel, implement or enhance internal compliance 
                                                                                                                     
 199. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. 
Code).  
 200. Press Release, SEC Awards More Than $14 Million to Whistleblower, U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n (Oct. 1, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/
PressRelease/1370539854258#.UsEJ3pqA2M8. 
 201. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. §78u-6 (2012). 
 202. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-15 (2014). The SEC states: “[W]e believe that the final rule 
appropriately incentivizes culpable whistleblowers to report securities violations while 
preventing culpable whistleblowers from financially benefiting from their own misconduct or 
misconduct for which they are substantially responsible.” Securities Whistleblower Incentives 
and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34300, 34350 (June 13, 2011). 
 203. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODD-
FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 20 (2014). 
 204. Id. at 1. 
 205. Id. Sean McKessy, Chief of the Office of the Whistleblower, points out that the award 
was “the fourth award to a whistleblower living in a foreign country, demonstrating the 
program’s international reach.” Id. 
 206. See FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 27, at 28 (“[D]ue diligence reduces the risk 
that the acquired company will continue to pay bribes.”). 
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programs, etc.) before the merger or acquisition takes place.207 This 
occurs because, while “[s]uccessor liability has not been squarely 
addressed in [FCPA] enforcement actions over the last few 
years[,] . . . avoiding such liability . . . has been a key driver of 
corporate behavior.”208 Indeed, M&A deals have become more complex 
and expensive as corporations have had to respond to an emerging 
doctrine where “[i]ssues of successor liability mean that the past 
improper practices of a target company may lead to problems for the 
acquiring company.”209  
Finally, the federal government might learn about potential FCPA 
violations through mandatory disclosures in required SEC filings210 or 
through increased cooperation with anticorruption regulators in foreign 
countries.211 Consider a multinational company based in the United 
                                                                                                                     
 207. Id. (noting that “the consequences of potential violations uncovered through due 
diligence can be handled by the parties in an orderly and efficient manner through negotiation of 
the costs and responsibilities for the investigation and remediation”). 
 208. Lucinda A. Low & John E. Davis, The FCPA in Investment Transactions, 1 FOREIGN 
CORRUPT PRAC. ACT REP. § 5:23 (2d ed. 2010); see also FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 27, 
at 28 (noting that the government will pursue successor (i.e., acquiring) companies only in 
“limited circumstances, generally in cases involving egregious and sustained violations or where 
the successor company directly participated in the violations or failed to stop the misconduct 
from continuing after the acquisition.”  Indeed, the government will “more often” pursue actions 
against the predecessor (i.e., acquired) company, “particularly when the acquiring company 
uncovered and timely remedied the violations or when the government’s investigation of the 
predecessor company preceded the acquisition”). 
 209. Linda Braude & Jonathan Nelms, FCPA Compliance in Russia, 41 REV. SEC. & 
COMMODITIES REG. 169, 176 (2008). 
 210. For example, the SEC requires public companies to certify in quarterly and annual 
reports that “they have disclosed to the company’s outside auditors and to the audit 
committee . . . any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees 
who have a significant role in the internal controls.” Scott W. Mackay, The Framework for 
Corporate Self-Governance: An Effective Ethics and Compliance Program, Address at the ABA 
Business Spring Meeting (Feb. 11, 2003), in ABA BUS. L. SEC. NEWSL., Apr. 4, 2003, at 10–13, 
available at http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/newsletter/0013/materials/aftermath.pdf. 
 211. See Gwendolyn L. Hassan, The Increasing Risk of Multijurisdictional Bribery 
Prosecution: Why Having an FCPA Compliance Program Is No Longer Enough, 42 INT’L L. 
NEWS 1 (2013) (setting forth several risk factors for multijurisdictional prosecution, including 
(1) the increasing number of new antibribery and anticorruption laws across the globe; (2) the 
strengthening of existing antibribery and anticorruption laws in other jurisdictions; (3) new 
enforcement efforts in other jurisdictions; and (4) increasing prevalence of cross-border 
antibribery and anticorruption investigations and enforcement); see also Kristine Robidoux et 
al., Anti-Bribery Legislation and Enforcement Pose Increasing Risks, MONDAQ (Dec. 30, 2014), 
http://www.mondaq.com/canada/x/362986/White+Collar+Crime+Fraud/Antibribery+legislation
+and+enforcement+pose+increasing+risks (noting that foreign anticorruption laws have 
increased in both number and scope in recent years, and that many of the laws are 
“extraterritorial in nature, and companies that find themselves offside anti-bribery laws in one 
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States with operations throughout the world. If a foreign government 
discovers corruption in a part of the company based within its own 
borders, that government is likely to contact American anticorruption 
regulators for assistance. This could lead to U.S. regulators initiating a 
separate investigation.212 It follows that the more widespread the illegal 
activity (in terms of the amount of money, geographic area, and number 
of individuals involved), the more likely it is that the corruption will 
come to light.213 
Despite those clear advantages to self-reporting, there is nonetheless 
a long list of possible negative consequences to doing so, including 
reputational harm;214 decreasing stock prices;215 decreasing employee 
morale;216 additional enforcement by foreign governments217 and 
                                                                                                                     
jurisdiction face the prospect of also being offside, and potentially prosecuted under, anti-
bribery laws in other jurisdictions”). 
 212. See Choi & Davis, supra note 152 (“The DOJ and SEC do not appear to temper their 
FCPA sanctions to take into account foreign regulators. It could be that the DOJ and SEC obtain 
better evidence when a foreign regulator is involved, allowing the DOJ and SEC to construct a 
stronger case leading to a higher sanction. Alternatively, an egregious FCPA violation may 
attract both U.S. and foreign regulators, leading to the positive correlation between foreign 
regulators and the U.S. sanction without implying any causation. Looking at country level data, 
we find evidence that the SEC and DOJ impose disproportionately large sanctions against firms 
from countries which have strong legal institutions and cooperation agreements with the DOJ or 
the SEC . . . .”). 
 213. Gerber et al., supra note 193, at 60.  
 214. See, e.g., Consolidated Complaint for Violation of the Federal Securities Laws, at 56; 
In re Titan, Inc. Securities Litigation, No. 04-CV-0676-LAB(NLS) (S.D. Cal. 2004) (“Moody’s 
has placed The Titan Corporation . . . on review for possible downgrade to reflect concerns 
about its reputation and cash flow from the impact of the company’s alleged violation of 
provisions set forth in the [FCPA].” (emphasis added) (quoting Moody’s Places the Titan 
Corporation on Review for Possible Downgrade, MOODY’S (July 1, 2004), 
https://www.moodys.com/research/MOODYS-PLACES-THE-TITAN-CORPORATION-ON-
REVIEW-FOR-POSSIBLE-DOWNGRADE--PR_83855)). 
 215. Raymund Wong & Patrick Conroy, FCPA Settlements: It’s A Small World After All, 
NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCS. (Jan. 28, 2009), 12, available at 
http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/archive1/Pub_FCPA_Settlements_0109_
Final2.pdf (“[I]n some instances the implication of an alleged FCPA violation is considered 
serious by the market, over and above what one might expect given the magnitude of any 
disgorgements, fines, or penalties paid. For example, when Syncor International Corporation 
announced to the public that it was investigating suspicious payments in Asia that may have 
violated the FCPA, its stock price plummeted almost 45% on a market-adjusted basis, implying 
a loss of $343 million in market capitalization, despite the relative small amount paid in its 
eventual settlement with the SEC and the DOJ.”). 
 216. See Gerber et al., supra note 193, at 10 (noting that self-reporting “negatively affects 
the company’s reputation and employee morale”). 
 217. See Matteson Ellis, Top FCPA Enforcement Trends to Expect in 2015, CORPORATE 
COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (Jan. 23, 2015), http://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/top-fcpa-
enforcement-trends-expect-2015/ (discussing the increased focus upon bribery investigations by 
foreign governments: “They are targeting individuals, as evidenced by Brazil’s focus on former 
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multilateral development banks,218 both of which can be assisted 
through multi-jurisdictional treaties and cooperation efforts;219 the filing 
of private civil suits, thereby exposing individual executives to FCPA 
liability and reputational damage;220 civil class actions and shareholder 
                                                                                                                     
executives of Embraer and Petrobras and Canada’s investigation of former employees of the 
engineering firm SNC-Lavalin. They are reaching blockbuster settlements with companies, such 
as the recent US $240 million enforcement action by Dutch authorities against SBM Offshore 
for bribery offenses in Brazil, Angola and Equatorial Guinea. They are pursuing high-profile 
targets, such as the ongoing investigation by the UK’s Serious Fraud Office into Rolls-Royce’s 
activities in China and Indonesia”). See generally Hassan, supra note 211 (noting that 
“anticorruption efforts in other countries have seen a marked increase”).  
 218. See Leonard McCarthy, Dealing with Corruption in Development: What Works and 
What Comes Next?, in WORLD BANK INTEGRITY VICE PRESIDENCY (INT) ANN. UPDATE 2013, at 
3, 7–8, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDOII/Resources/588889-
1381352645465/INT_Annual_Update_FY13_WEB.pdf (discussing the bank’s dedication to 
investigating and prosecuting corruption and other illicit practices in bank-financed projects). 
 219. In an FCPA case brought against Hewlett-Packard, for example, the DOJ and SEC 
worked with the Public Prosecutor’s Office in Dresden, Germany; the DOJ also acknowledged 
“significant assistance” from the Polish Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, the Polish Anti-
Corruption Bureau, and “the contributions of our law enforcement partners in other countries 
involved in this matter.” Press Release, Dep’t. of Justice, Hewlett-Packard Russia Agrees to 
Plead Guilty to Foreign Bribery (Apr. 9, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/hewlett-packard-russia-agrees-plead-guilty-foreign-bribery; see Press Release, U.S. Secs. 
& Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Hewlett-Packard with FCPA Violations (Apr. 9 2014), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370541453075#.
VQ26zU10zcs; see also Mary Jo White, The Challenge of Coverage, Accountability and 
Deterrence in Global Enforcement, Remarks at the IOSCO 39th Annual Conference (Oct. 1, 
2014) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/
1370543090864#.VMrHqyxrWew) (“Rarely is there a week when one or more of the cases 
recommended by the enforcement staff does not involve critical international assistance. In fact, 
in the last fiscal year, the SEC made more than 900 requests for international assistance and, as 
a result, we were able to obtain critical evidence that helped us prosecute wrongdoers for a vast 
array of serious offenses.”); Sung-Hee Suh, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Implications for 
U.S. Law on EU Practice, Remarks at the Practising Law Institute’s 14th Annual Institute on 
Securities Regulation in Europe (2015) (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/ 
pr/deputy-assistant-attorney-general-sung-hee-suh-speaks-pli-s-14th-annual-institute-securities) 
(discussing international bribery as well as international securities and commodities fraud). Suh 
stated that the DOJ is “increasingly coordinating with domestic and foreign regulators and law 
enforcement counterparts” and that the DOJ is “building and relying upon . . . relationships with 
our foreign counterparts to gather evidence, locate individuals overseas, conduct parallel 
investigations of similar conduct, and, when appropriate, coordinate the timing and scope of 
resolutions[,] . . . including accounting for the corporate monetary penalties paid in other 
jurisdictions when appropriate.” Id. 
 220. An expert testifying on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce stated to Congress: 
When companies and their senior officers and directors face personal civil 
liability in addition to any exposure to the DOJ and SEC, their judgments 
regarding what issues to investigate and what results to report to the DOJ and 
SEC necessarily will be affected, possibly to the detriment of the integrity of 
the government’s investigation. 
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litigation against the company;221 and, for government contractors, 
suspension or debarment.222  
Any of these possible negative consequences of self-reporting could 
lead to increased expenditures in time, energy, and money for the 
company involved, especially when self-reporting results in wider 
government investigations. After a company self-reports a possible 
FCPA violation, the federal government will sometimes conduct its own 
independent investigation (albeit at the expense of the self-reporting 
company)—a process that can cost hundreds of thousands (if not 
millions) of dollars and take many months (if not years) to complete.223 
                                                                                                                     
Can We Sue Our Way to Prosperity?: Litigation’s Effect on America’s Global Competitiveness: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 
41 (2011) (statement of John H. Beisner, Skadden, Arps L.L.P., testifying on behalf of the U.S. 
Chamber Institute for Legal Reform), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
112hhrg66540/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg66540.pdf. 
 221. In shareholder litigation, plaintiffs sue alleging that bribery or corruption caused 
inaccurate pricing of stocks because of the benefits from bribery. In recent years, shareholders 
and former employees have sued corporations under securities laws, alleging that they 
purchased shares at inflated prices. See Khadijah M. Britton, Avon Shareholders’ FCPA China 
Bribe Class Action Tossed, LAW360 (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.law360.com/
articles/581981/avon-shareholders-fcpa-china-bribe-class-action-tossed (discussing the 
dismissal of a class action lawsuit by Avon Products Inc. shareholders that accused the company 
and its senior executives of falsely inflating stock prices by hiding violations of the FCPA); 
Michael Volkov, Additional Costs Of FCPA Investigations—Collateral Litigation, JDSUPRA 
BUS. ADVISOR (Sept. 9, 2013), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/additional-costs-of-fcpa-
investigations-29362/ (discussing the difference between the shareholder derivative action and 
the shareholder class action, and noting that “[t]ypically, plaintiffs launch these cases 
immediately after an FCPA investigation is disclosed. . . . In one particular situation, 23 
individual shareholder actions were filed within two weeks of the disclosure of an FCPA 
investigation”); see also Nick Thornton, Avon Faces Class-Action ‘Stock-Drop’ Suit, 
BENEFITSPRO (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.benefitspro.com/2015/01/08/avon-faces-class-action-
stock-drop-suit (discussing a class action “stock drop” lawsuit against Avon Products Inc. by 
participants in company retirement plans in which plaintiffs allege that Avon should have frozen 
its purchase of company stock for the retirement plans as it was being investigated under the 
FCPA). 
 222. Under guidelines put forth by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget, individuals 
or firms that violate the FCPA can have their export licenses suspended, or they might be barred 
from doing business with the federal government. See 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-2 (2013); see also 
Lucinda A. Low et al., The European Commission’s First Biannual EU Anti-Corruption Report, 
STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP n.6 (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.steptoe.com/publications-9420.html 
(noting that, in U.S. v. Siemens AG, the DOJ charged Siemens with violating the FCPA’s books 
and records provisions instead of bribery in part to avoid the damaging collateral consequences 
of a bribery conviction, including mandatory permanent debarment in the EU). 
 223. See Ensign, supra note 4 (noting that Avon Products Inc. “ha[s] spent approximately 
$350 million on legal and other fees tied to” the government investigation surrounding an FCPA 
matter); see also Jacqueline C. Wolff & Pamela Sawhney, FCPA Voluntary Disclosures: A 
Risk/Benefit Analysis, COVINGTON & BURLING LLP 3 (2007), http://www.cov.com/files/ 
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Since the government will likely decide the direction, speed, and 
aggressiveness of these investigations, companies need to carefully 
consider the implications of ceding this kind of power and control to the 
government; indeed, “the company may find itself in unwanted and 
unpleasant situations, such as helping the government prosecute a 
formerly valued employee or even a valued customer or business 
partner.”224  
Moreover, these investigations can be difficult and complex. They 
can involve third-party agents, subcontractors, and subsidiaries located 
in other regions or countries.225 They can lead to government inquiries 
regarding other transactions, deals or projects, other accounting entries, 
and other internal investigations that the company has carried out.226 
This, in turn, can lead to government findings of unlawful activities 
beyond (or in addition to) bribery, including tax violations, government 
contracting violations, or export control violations. Costs to the 
company can include employee time spent gathering data, organizing 
documents, and talking with investigators, as well as time spent hiring 
                                                                                                                     
Publication/97ca6c31-614b-4ace-a441-6dab61135c65/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ 
3980bda8-c3b1-4f62-9df9-7845d53e1764/FCPA%20Voluntary%20Disclosures%20-%20A% 
20Risk-Benefit%20Analysis.pdf (noting that the ensuing government investigation “tends to be 
significantly broader than the violation disclosed. A disclosure of a few improper payments by a 
small subsidiary in a small market can become a government investigation into the parent’s 
worldwide activities—all paid for by the disclosing company”). 
 224. Marshall, supra note 192, at 2. 
 225. See WORLD ECON. FORUM, GOOD PRACTICE GUIDELINES ON CONDUCTING THIRD-
PARTY DUE DILIGENCE 6 (2013), available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_PACI_
ConductingThirdPartyDueDiligence_Guidelines_2013.pdf (discussing the importance 
“conduct[ing] reasonable due diligence before entering into a business relationship” with agents, 
advisors, subsidiaries, contractors, subcontractors, suppliers, etc., as well as the importance of 
“undertak[ing] appropriate measures to ensure that the third party does not engage in improper 
conduct”). 
 226. Arguably internal investigations constitute privileged information in accordance with 
Upjohn Co. v. United States. See 449 U.S. 383, 401–02 (1981). However, in some jurisdictions 
if the company has shared written reports of such investigations with auditors, which is a 
common practice, then the company may have waived any privilege. See Thomas R. Mulroy & 
Eric J. Munoz, The Internal Corporate Investigation, 1 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L. J. 49, 61 (2002) 
(“[A]ttorney-client communications disclosed to third parties, not for the purpose of assisting 
the attorney in rendering legal advice, lose their privilege. Privilege-waiving disclosures to third 
parties can arise in a number of contexts, including disclosure of materials to: a client’s 
underwriter and accountant; a corporation’s investment banker; one’s adversary in separate 
litigation, even if under a confidentiality agreement; and a witness in preparation for testimony.” 
(emphasis added)); see also In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 756 F.3d 754, 756–57 (D.C. Cir. 
2014) (preserving the core holding of Upjohn by ruling that, in the context of an internal 
company investigation, the attorney–client privilege applies to confidential communications 
between a company’s attorneys and its employees as long as a primary purpose of the 
communication was providing or obtaining legal advice). 
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outside legal counsel, accountants, and consultants to assist with the 
investigation.227  
Finally, an investigation by one federal agency could very well 
expand into a multi-agency investigation. For example, after it 
completes its own investigation, the SEC has the ability to refer a matter 
to law enforcement authorities if it believes there is evidence of a 
willful violation,228 and federal securities laws authorize the SEC to 
share evidence—including its own investigation files—with the DOJ for 
this purpose.229 While the SEC’s guidance on cooperation sheds very 
little light on the factors that would lead the SEC to make such referrals, 
it seems likely that the factors considered would be (1) the amounts of 
money involved; (2) the severity and pervasiveness of the transgression; 
and (3) the cooperator’s level of culpability.230 Nevertheless, there 
should be more guidance from the government on this matter because it 
certainly plays a role in calculating the risks and rewards of self-
reporting violations and cooperating thereafter. 
CONCLUSION 
The federal government needs to be more transparent and 
forthcoming regarding exactly what the benefits will be when corporate 
entities elect to self-report FCPA violations. Although the risks 
associated with voluntary disclosure tend to be concrete and predictable, 
the rewards have been largely uncertain. Ultimately, the government 
considers many factors in addition to self-reporting when dealing with a 
FCPA matter.231 The DOJ and SEC must be more transparent about the 
                                                                                                                     
 227. See Ceresney, Conference Remarks, supra note 5 (noting that in the Layne 
Christensen FCPA matter “the company provided real-time reports of its investigative findings, 
produced English language translations of documents, made foreign witnesses available, and 
shared summaries of witness interviews and forensic reports”); see also Press Release, U.S. 
DOJ, Avon China Pleads Guilty to Violating the FCPA by Concealing More Than $8 Million in 
Gifts to Chinese Officials (Dec. 17, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/avon-
china-pleads-guilty-violating-fcpa-concealing-more-8-million-gifts-chinese-officials (noting that 
the company performed numerous tasks that were helpful to the DOJ, “including conducting an 
extensive internal investigation, voluntarily making U.S. and foreign employees available for 
interviews, and collecting, analyzing, translating and organizing voluminous evidence”). 
 228. 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(b) (2013); see also ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, supra note 66, § 5.6 
(noting authority to refer matters to other regulatory and disciplinary bodies). 
 229. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), 78u(d)(1) (2012). 
 230. John A. Nathanson & Jason M. Swergold, SEC’s Cooperation Initiative: Should 
You Go Along to Get Along? N.Y.L.J. (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/ 
id=1202619610358/SECs-Cooperation-Initiative-Should-You-Go-Along-to-Get-Along (subscription 
required). 
 231. As discussed in Part III, supra, federal prosecutors have a large amount of discretion 
in deciding what to do with potential FCPA violators—whether to prosecute at all, what charges 
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weight they will give (or not give) to voluntary disclosure versus other 
factors. If benefits were quantified and linked to specific factors 
involved in DOJ and SEC decision-making, companies would have a 
more accurate sense of what it means when a government official says 
that self-reporting is “a huge factor”232 in deciding whether and how to 
prosecute a company, that there will be “meaningful credit”233 for 
companies that provide voluntary disclosure, or that self-reporting 
wrongful FCPA conduct is “always” 234 in the company’s best interest. 
Part of the difficulty is the lack of traditional FCPA jurisprudence. 
Because most cases are settled through NPAs and DPAs,235 little 
guidance exists regarding the interpretation of the FCPA and its 
application to various fact patterns and real-life situations. Without 
trials, jury verdicts, and appellate court decisions, legal precedent is not 
being developed in this area of the law. According to one commentator, 
such precedent is crucial because it allows courts to “clarify the 
boundaries of permissible legal conduct by resolving questions of 
ambiguity and vagueness; striking down overreaching laws as 
unconstitutional; and signaling to legislators where legal gaps exist.”236 
While the DOJ and SEC published a much-anticipated guidebook 
regarding the statute in November of 2012 (FCPA Resource Guide),237 
that publication was said to “break[] little new ground” in shedding light 
on what can sometimes be a subtle and complicated area of the law.238  
                                                                                                                     
to bring if prosecution moves forward, and how much of a penalty discount to give if there is a 
negotiated resolution.  
 232. See Ensign, supra note 4 (quoting James Koukios, Senior Deputy Chief of the Justice 
Department’s Criminal–Fraud Section). 
 233. Koehler, World Bribery, supra note 3 (quoting Charles Duross, then-Deputy Chief of 
the DOJ’s Criminal–Fraud Section). 
 234. Ceresney, Conference Remarks, supra note 5. 
 235. See Koehler, FCPA 101, supra note 178 (“Nearly every FCPA enforcement action 
against a company in this new era of FCPA enforcement is resolved through a non-prosecution 
agreement . . . or a deferred prosecution agreement . . . .”). 
 236. Allen R. Brooks, Comment, A Corporate Catch-22: How Deferred and Non-
Prosecution Agreements Impede the Full Development of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 7 
J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 137, 155 (2010); see Pollack & Reisinger, supra note 184 (discussing how 
litigated cases “provide judicial opinions regarding what conduct violates the criminal laws and 
what does not. Thus, in addition to the criminal statutes themselves, corporations and 
individuals (at least those advised by competent counsel) would have guidance available to them 
in the form of judicial opinions providing elaboration as to what specific fact patterns 
constituted criminal behavior and, likewise, what fact patterns did not”). 
 237. See supra note 27.  
 238. Kevin J. Harnisch et al., The Disappearing Exception for Facilitating Payments, N.Y. 
L.J. (Feb. 11, 2013), available at http://friedfrank.com/siteFiles/Publications/NYLJ%20-
%20Harnisch-Witzel-Roth%20Feb%202013.pdf. 
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In the FCPA Resource Guide, the government says it places a “high 
premium” on self-reporting.239 However, the guide then merely sets 
forth relevant provisions of the DOJ’s Principles of Prosecution, the 
Sentencing Guidelines, and the SEC’s Seaboard Report and 
Enforcement Manual.240 Numerous national and international business 
advocacy groups and associations have suggested that the government 
should publish a discussion of the application of those provisions and 
principles to realistic (even if hypothetical) business scenarios and 
situations.241 Again, such a discussion should include objective, detailed 
information on how the government weighs each individual factor of 
self-reporting, cooperation, remedial measures, and other relevant 
factors. And it should also include more detailed information regarding 
how, when, and why the DOJ or SEC might decide upon prosecuting 
particular FCPA matters versus offering declinations, plea deals, or pre-
trial diversion agreements such as DPAs or NPAs.242 A small amount of 
progress has been made in this direction regarding declination 
decisions: the DOJ and SEC have been a bit more forthcoming in the 
last several years regarding when and why they have decided to decline 
pursuing a particular FCPA matter.243 However, the limited progress 
                                                                                                                     
 239. FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 27, at 54. 
 240. Id. at 54–56. 
 241. See Letter from U.S. Chamber of Commerce and thirty-two other business groups and 
associations, to Lanny A. Breuer, then-Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S. 
DOJ, and George S. Canellos, then-Acting Director of Enforcement, U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (Feb. 19, 2013). The letter responded to the December 2012 publication 
of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Resource Guide, available at 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/Coalition_Letter_to_DOJ_and_SEC_re_
Guidance_2-19-13.pdf. 
 242. Id.  
 243. In 2014, four declinations involved companies that had self-reported possible FCPA 
violations to the government. These companies included Image Sensing, LyondellBassell, 
Layne Christensen, and SBM Offshore. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Alert, WILMERHALE 11–
12 (Jan. 27, 2015), https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/
Editorial/Publications/WH_Publications/Client_Alert_PDfs/FCPA%20YIR%20Alert_01%2027 
%2015.pdf. However, given the limited amount of information made available to the public, it is 
difficult to determine with any kind of certainty or specificity the reasoning behind the 
government’s decisions. While it seems clear that self-reporting the potential violations played a 
role in the final outcomes, it is impossible to know how the DOJ weighted that particular 
element against other elements of cooperation also factored into the decision-making process. 
For example, in the Layne Christensen case, the public learned little more than the fact that the 
DOJ declined to prosecute based on self-disclosure and exemplary cooperation and significant 
remediation. The question that needs to be addressed is: How were each of these elements 
weighted when the DOJ was making its final decision? See Russ Berland, Brian O’Bleness & 
Shellie Clausen, Showing Leadership: Layne’s Journey from FCPA Investigation to DOJ 
Declination, ASS’N OF CORPORATE COUNSEL 6–8 (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.acc.com/
chapters/midam/upload/2014-10-08_Stinson-Leonard_Street_PPTX-KS-NE.pdf. In the Image 
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made in the narrow and focused area of declinations must expand to the 
broader issues discussed in this Article. Companies need greater 
transparency regarding the specific benefits that the government will 
provide to reward particular cooperative behaviors that companies 
exhibit.  
Moreover, businesses and their advocacy groups and associations are 
not the only ones calling for increased transparency in this regard. 
During the past decade, a number of scholars and former high-ranking 
SEC and DOJ officials have put forth proposals to amend the FCPA in 
various ways.244 Not only has the government failed to take meaningful 
                                                                                                                     
Sensing case, the public learned through a company press release that the DOJ declined to 
pursue the matter due to the company’s “voluntary disclosure, thorough investigation, 
cooperation and voluntary enhancements to its compliance program.” Again, members of the 
public need access to additional information if they want to have the ability to assess how each 
individual factor was weighted in the DOJ’s decision-making process. See ISS Announces 
Completion of Department of Justice Investigation, IMAGE SENSING SYS. (Sept. 8, 2014), 
http://www.imagesensing.com/company/news-and-events/140908.html. This same weakness 
occurs with the information on declinations set forth by the DOJ and the SEC in their 2012 
FCPA Resource Guide, which provides six anonymized examples of FCPA matters in which the 
government declined to take enforcement action. All six examples share the following five 
elements: (1) the company self-reported the potential violation to the government; (2) the 
company undertook an internal investigation; (3) the company took immediate action to halt the 
wrongdoing; (4) the company cooperated fully with the government; and (5) the company in 
some way strengthened compliance, either through remedial compliance training or through 
specific upgrades to its current compliance program. While this information is helpful, it is, 
again, impossible for one to discern how the government weighted each individual element 
mentioned in its decision-making process. See FCPA RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 27, at 77–79. 
 244. See, e.g., Judge Stanley Sporkin, Speech at the ABA National Institute on the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act: Origins of the FCPA (Oct. 16, 2006), available at 
http://www.nacdl.org/WorkArea/ DownloadAsset.aspx?id=21764&libID (proposing an FCPA 
“immunization-inoculation program” that would “serve the dual purpose of: (1) creating suitable 
incentives to compliance-minded companies to adopt and maintain high ethical standards in the 
conduct of their business; and (2) reducing the case load and investigative burden of 
governmental agencies that enforce the FCPA while reassuring regulators that companies are 
taking active steps to limit corruption in their foreign contracting and other activities”); James 
R. Doty, Toward a Reg. FCPA: A Modest Proposal for Change in Administering the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, 62 BUS. L. 1233, 1233–34 (2007) (former SEC General Counsel 
advocating for a “Reg. FCPA” and a “new approach to administration of the FCPA, one that 
would provide a measure of regulatory certainty to public companies regarding the elements of 
good faith compliance. The policy issue before us in the FCPA area is not whether the cases that 
are being charged and prosecuted can be brought consistent with the standards of the statute; 
rather, the issue is whether our law enforcement agencies should be left to devise their own, 
case-by-case interpretation of the FCPA, without the rigor of greater regulatory clarity and the 
benefits of more consistent administrative interpretation” (emphasis added)); Stephen A. Fraser, 
Introduction to Placing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on the Tracks in the Race for 
Amnesty, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1009 (2012) (suggesting that the government implement an FCPA 
amnesty program similar to that of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division, where 
transgressing companies are able to calculate the discounts they would likely receive through 
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steps toward implementing any of the proposals, it has also failed to 
address the underlying, unifying issue that appears to motivate these 
proposals: The need for increased guidance and certainty for businesses 
worldwide that are attempting to abide by a rather complex and 
sometimes confusing statute. While the government need not implement 
any proposed changes that might somehow weaken the current 
statute,245 it does need to heed this clarion call for increased 
transparency.  
The FCPA guidance and transparency sought by businesses, 
academics, former high-ranking government officials, and others within 
                                                                                                                     
cooperation); Mike Koehler, Revisiting A Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense, 
2012 WIS. L. REV. 609, 659 (arguing that the implementation of an FCPA compliance defense 
would “better incentivize more robust corporate compliance, reduce improper conduct, and 
further advance the FCPA's objective of preventing bribery of foreign officials”); Robert W. 
Tarun & Peter P. Tomczak, Introductory Essay: A Proposal for a United States Department of 
Justice Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Leniency Policy, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 153, 156 (2010) 
(advocating for a DOJ “Fraud Section FCPA leniency policy modeled after the Antitrust 
Division’s . . . Corporate Leniency Program”); id. at 172 (citing George J. Terwilliger, Proposed 
Change in DOJ Policy: Presumption of No Criminal Disposition for Voluntary Disclosure, 
Prepared Remarks for the Marcus Evans FCPA & Anti-Corruption Compliance Conference 
(June 23, 2010) (former Deputy Attorney General outlining an FCPA amnesty policy in which 
“there would be a presumption against criminal prosecution or disposition for organizations that 
voluntarily disclose wrongdoing and thereafter cooperate with the government by, for example, 
providing the results of an internal investigation and/or cooperating with additional government 
investigation”)); Larry D. Thompson, In-Sourcing Corporate Responsibility for Enforcement of 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 199, 216–17 (2014) (former Deputy 
Attorney General proposing that (1) “if a corporation establishes a comprehensive, fully funded, 
adequately staffed and trained FCPA compliance program, then the rogue employee who 
circumvents it and violates the FCPA . . . should be deemed to be acting outside the realm of his 
corporate responsibilities and the self-reporting corporation should not be held criminally liable 
for his misconduct” and (2) “that a genuinely cooperative, self-reporting company with a proper 
compliance program must be assured that it will not be debarred from contracting with the 
United States government or receiving the government permits required to run its operations”). 
 245. See, e.g., David Kennedy & Dan Danielsen, Busting Bribery: Sustaining the Global 
Momentum of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, OPEN SOC’Y FOUNDS. 31 (2011), available at 
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/Busting%2520Bribery2011September
.pdf (arguing that “[c]reating a ‘compliance defense’ to knowing and intentional violations of 
the Act would amount to eliminating criminal liability under the Act all together by permitting a 
‘fig leaf’ compliance program to insulate companies from knowing and intentional wrong-
doing”). But see Koehler, supra note 244, at 659 (“A company’s pre-existing FCPA compliance 
policies and procedures and its good-faith efforts to comply with the FCPA should be relevant 
as a matter of law—not merely in the opaque, inconsistent, and unpredictable world of DOJ 
decision making—when a non-executive employee or agent acts contrary to those policies and 
procedures. An FCPA compliance defense would not eliminate corporate criminal liability 
under the FCPA or reward ‘fig leaf’ or ‘purely paper’ compliance. Rather, an FCPA compliance 
defense, among other things, will better incentivize more robust corporate compliance, reduce 
improper conduct, and further advance the FCPA’s objective of preventing bribery of foreign 
officials. The time is right to revisit an FCPA compliance defense.”). 
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the general public is the very kind of information that would naturally 
come to light if trials, jury verdicts, and appellate court decisions were 
the norm in this area of law. But since such verdicts and court decisions 
are not the norm in FCPA matters, and since courts are not generating 
legal precedent and providing the guidance, the federal government 
should be more aggressive in stepping in to fill the void. In other words, 
because the courts currently play such a negligible role in interpreting 
and applying the FCPA, it is the federal government—whether through 
Congress or through the DOJ and SEC—that has the power, the ability, 
and the responsibility to provide the necessary guidance. So far, the 
government has failed in this important task. While the government 
attempted to fulfill this responsibility by issuing the FCPA Resource 
Guide, Steven Tyrrell, former Chief of the DOJ’s Fraud Section, called 
the publication “more of a scrapbook of past DOJ and SEC successes 
than a guide book for companies who care about playing by the 
rules.”246 
Meanwhile, if comparing the costs and benefits of self-reporting 
FCPA violations continues to be a “guessing game” for corporate 
entities and their counsel,247 some will surely conclude that the overall 
costs of voluntary disclosure outweigh the overall benefits. In Ralph 
Lauren, the company’s decision to self-report an FCPA violation 
resulted in a reduced penalty from the government.248 However, as 
practitioners at a leading national law firm state, it is not clear that any 
such discount “was sufficient to cover the . . . investigative and other 
costs incurred by the company as a result of the self-report, and the 
additional burdens the company has agreed to shoulder by entering into 
the NPAs.”249 That assessment—that the rewards conferred by the 
government for electing to self-report might, in some cases, not be 
worth the costs involved—even if targeted to one particular case, is the 
sort of conclusion the federal government likely does not want to hear 
from FCPA professionals working on the front lines.250  
                                                                                                                     
 246. Joe Palazzolo, U.S. Attempts to Clarify Antibribery Law, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 14, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324735104578118850181434228.html. 
 247. Ensign, supra note 4 (quoting Laurence Urgenson, Partner at Mayer Brown LLP). 
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In the end, self-reporting is only one of numerous factors influencing 
whether and how the government decides to pursue a given FCPA 
matter.251 With that knowledge in hand, and with the insights learned 
from Ralph Lauren and the other FCPA cases set forth in this Article, a 
corporate entity, when faced with the discovery of an FCPA violation, 
could reasonably conclude the following: “We choose to keep quiet and 
not voluntarily disclose. If by chance the issue comes to light at a later 
time, which it may or may not, then it appears the consequences won’t 
be much harsher than if we had self-reported the matter ourselves—
especially if we immediately agree to engage in significant and ongoing 
cooperation and remediation activities with the government.”252 In 
putting forth this possibility, this Article is neither advocating for nor 
condoning a corporate entity’s choice to not self-disclose a violation to 
the federal government. Rather, this Article simply points out that if the 
matter is truly a business decision prompting companies to undertake a 
cost–benefit analysis, then ultimately choosing not to self-report would, 
in many instances, likely be a reasonable decision based upon the 
information currently made available through the disposition of 
previous FCPA cases.253  
                                                                                                                     
financial and operational burden on a company may, in any given instance, outweigh credit 
received.”). 
 251. As discussed in Part III, supra, the federal government has enormous discretion in 
deciding what to do with potential FCPA violators—whether to prosecute at all, what charges to 
bring if prosecution moves forward, and how much of a penalty discount to give should there be 
a negotiated resolution. 
 252. See Ensign, supra note 4. Ensign quotes attorney Aaron Murphy, who suggested that 
instead of self-reporting an FCPA problem to the government, attorneys can “document 
everything very, very well, wrap it up and put a bow on it and put it on the shelf. Then one day 
if the government comes asking you can say, ‘Hey, look this is old news, we fixed it when we 
found out about it.’” Id.; see also DOJ Officials Encourage Companies to Cooperate Against 
Potentially Culpable Individuals, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP FCPA UPDATE, Sept. 2014, at 2 
(reporting that Marshall Miller, DOJ’s Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the 
Criminal Division, stated at a Global Investigations Review conference in September 2014 that, 
in determining whether to bring charges against a company, the fourth of nine Principles of 
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (or so-called ‘Filip factors’) instructs prosecutors 
to consider both “the corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its 
willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents.” Miller noted that companies too 
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CORP. COUNS., May 2011, at 19 (reporting an interview with Professor Mike Koehler, who 
states: “The enforcement agencies will tell you that they give credit for voluntary disclosures. 
However, from a strict dollars-and-cents perspective, realize this—if a company receives X 
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Moving forward, to increase the likelihood that companies will 
consistently choose to self-report FCPA violations, and thereby assist in 
eradicating the scourge of transnational bribery worldwide, the DOJ and 
SEC must be more forthcoming and transparent. Their policies, 
pronouncements, rules, and regulations must provide more certain, 
specific, and calculable incentives to companies for volunteering to 
come forward. The limited amount of information that the DOJ and 
SEC currently provide gives these agencies two enormously powerful 
tools in their dealings with alleged wrongdoers: flexibility and 
discretion.254 If the agencies do not set forth the benefits and incentive 
structures in a completely forthcoming and transparent manner, then 
each successive FCPA matter that comes before either agency can be 
negotiated on a relatively blank canvas—quite a different negotiation 
than would take place if the agencies were more constrained and 
directed through explicit, detailed, and specific rules, policies, and 
regulations that were relatively certain to be applied in each case, i.e., 
something that looked more like legal precedent.255  
Indeed, a top DOJ official acknowledged the frustration existing 
within the private sector over the lack of certainty in self-reporting 
benefits but then proceeded to point out, according to one report, “that 
the DOJ needs to retain flexibility and thus cannot make categorical 
pronouncements on the impact of a company’s determination to self-
report.”256 This Article suggests, however, that companies will be more 
                                                                                                                     
percent credit because of its self-disclosure, it is likely that the company will have spent X plus 
ten percent more on legal fees and related expenses to obtain that X percent credit”). 
 254. See Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 111th Cong. 4 
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Committee, Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs); U.S. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME AND DRUGS 4 (Nov. 30, 2010), available at 
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/10-11-30%20Volkov%20Testimony.pdf 
(testifying that the DOJ has not provided clarity on the matter of voluntary disclosure, 
but instead offers “vague promises of benefits and little to no certainty as to results, all to 
preserve its discretion to impose a fine and plea as they see fit” (emphasis added)). 
 255. See Editor, supra note 253 (reporting an interview with Professor Mike Koehler, who, 
when asked by the Editor if the DOJ’s corporate leniency policies have been successful in 
creating incentives for self-reporting, stated: “To the extent there are any leniency policies, they 
are ad hoc and generally not transparent. That is part of the problem. FCPA enforcement suffers 
from a lack of transparency like no other area of the law.”). 
 256. See DOJ’s and SEC’s FCPA Enforcement Priorities, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP 
FCPA UPDATE, Nov. 2011, at 9 (reporting on the 26th National Conference on the FCPA 
organized by the American Conference Institute in Nov. 2011: “[Fraud Section Deputy Chief 
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likely to self-report in large numbers, and regarding significant FCPA 
matters, if and when they can determine with certainty and specificity 
that the rewards obtained will outweigh the risks involved. Scott D. 
Hammond, the DOJ’s former Deputy Assistant Attorney General for 
Criminal Enforcement in the Antitrust Division, bolsters this conclusion 
by stating that a “key component” to the success of that division’s 
highly successful Corporate Leniency Program is “transparency and 
predictability.”257 Commenting on leniency programs more generally, 
Hammond states: “If companies cannot confidently predict how an 
enforcement authority will apply its leniency program, [they] may 
ultimately decide against self-reporting and cooperation . . . .”258 
Given that voluntary disclosure appears to be the “engine that fuels” 
the government’s FCPA enforcement program,259 and given that there is 
“every reason to believe that much more misconduct is unearthed within 
the corporate setting than is publicly disclosed,”260 any changes leading 
to increased self-reporting of FCPA violations would simultaneously 
lead to (1) more company accountability for wrongdoing; (2) less 
government spending on costly investigations; and (3) more money 
accumulating in the U.S. Treasury through substantial fines. While the 
DOJ and SEC might argue that changes to the status quo are 
unnecessary, this Article urges the federal government to work toward 
bringing about the increases in certainty, predictability, and 
transparency discussed herein and contends that achieving those goals 
would be highly beneficial to companies, to the American public, and, 
most importantly, to the people and institutions throughout the nation 
and world currently suffering the ill effects of transnational bribery. 
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